Silent but Strong: US - Malaysia Defence Ties Adam Leong Kok Wey

Contrary to popular belief, both the United States (US) and Malaysia have a long record of strong defence ties. In a speech delivered 20 years ago in Washington D.C., the then Defense Minister, Dato’ Sri Haji Najib Razak has stated that the US-Malaysia defense relationship as “an all too well-kept secret”. The US and Malaysia have built a strong relationship in defence as soon as Malaysia was formed in 1963, albeit not well publicized.  This article will look into some highlights of this long defence ties and why it is a “well-kept secret”.

When Malaysia was formed on 16 September 1963, it faced a Confrontation (also known as the Konfrontasi) launched by its neighbour, Indonesia. The Konfrontasi was an “undeclared war” fought between Malaysia and Indonesia. The conflict started when Malaysia, consisting of Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore, was formed.  Indonesia under President Sukarno was vehemently against the formation of Malaysia, which Sukarno saw as a British grand strategy to contain Indonesia’s geopolitical ambitions in the region.  Indonesia then was suspected to be sympathetic to the communists and they were worries among the Western powers that Indonesia may be used as a springboard to support the spread of communism in the region. Numerous Southeast Asia countries were facing internal communist insurgencies at that point and these suspicions were well-grounded then.

Sukarno launched a “Ganyang Malaysia” or “crush Malaysia” campaign, initially using political, economic, propaganda, and later military means against Malaysia. British Commonwealth forces were deployed to assist in the defence of Malaysia. The US had also provided some key assistance then, lesser known today, but with vital strategic consequences for Malaysia.

To support Malaysia, the US has agreed to sell weapons on credit, invited Malaysian leaders to visit Washington D.C. (Malaysia’s first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman visited and met the US President in 1964), and US Navy vessels visited Malaysian ports as a show of force and support. The US has also extended its Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) defence obligations to Australian military units based in Malaysia as a deterrence against targeted attacks by Indonesian forces. This key US decision led to strong commitments by Australia to assist in defending Malaysia. The US has also suspended shipments of arms and ammunition to Indonesia and scuttled its plan to provide Indonesia USD400 million in economic aid.

These measures managed to coerce Indonesia to wage a low-intensity subversive conflict which otherwise may had escalated into a more intensive war. The Konfrontasi lasted until 1966. Indonesia under its new leader Suharto (who had replaced Sukarno at the end of 1965 in the midst of a failed coup), and suffering serious military setbacks and without much international support for its cause, decided to explore diplomatic options in ending the conflict. Both Indonesia and Malaysia held peace talks leading to the final conclusion of the undeclared war with the signing of a peace treaty in Bangkok.

Reciprocating the important strategic ties with the US, Malaysia served as an important tropical training acclimatisation post which provided jungle warfare training to US troops rotating into South Vietnam.  Both Malaysia and the US shared common strategic goals in combatting communism then. Malaysia fought its Second Communist Insurgency from 1968 to 1989.

The subsequent US pull-out from the Southeast Asia region in the early-1970s as part of its ‘Nixon Doctrine’ (announced in 1969), has seen Malaysia building its own defence self-reliance capabilities with the acquisition of US made weapons such as the Northrop F-5E Tiger IIs (in 1975) and started to use US-made M-16A1s as its main infantry assault rifle. Later in 1982, Malaysia also procured Douglas A-4 Skyhawks from the US to bolster its tactical air support capabilities.

Malaysia’s military ties with the US were put on a stronger footing with the inclusion of Malaysia in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in 1982.  The IMET provided approximately USD1 million annually for funding of military training and education courses to the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF).  These strong and robust defence training ties continued to strengthen over the decades.  In more recent years, around 50 Malaysian Armed Forces personnel attend various courses in the US annually via the IMET program. 

To strengthen both militaries’ capabilities, capacities, networking and ability to operate in joint operations, the US and Malaysia have engaged in various bilateral and multilateral military training exercises over the last few decades. For example, Malaysia has been part of the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise series since it began in 1995.  Other exercises that the MAF has taken part included the “Rim of the Pacific” (RIMPAC) multilateral naval exercises, Cope Taufan, Keris Strike, Tiger Strike and Air Warrior.  These exercises are mutually beneficial and have given MAF personnel valuable capacity-building experience.

Both the US and Malaysia also share mutual national interests such as counter-terrorism.  During the early years of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Malaysia has allowed about a thousand US military overflights per year. Malaysia has also sent a military medical team with 40 personnel to Bamiyan Province in Afghanistan in 2010 which had conducted four deployments.

In more recent years, both the US and Malaysia have shared interests in ensuring a rules-based international order (especially, today, in the South China Sea).  The US has also provided assistance in MAF capability-building programs for maritime domain awareness missions. For example, in 2017, the US has provided nearly US$200 million in grant assistance to the MAF.

However, these close strategic and defence ties between the US and Malaysia are often conducted quietly. Why is that so?

There are two plausible answers to this question. Firstly, domestic views matter in foreign and defence policies. The Malaysian general public has not viewed the US positively for some of its international engagements. The US has also been seen as being too supportive of one side in the continuous Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Secondly, Malaysia’s stated foreign policy of neutrality and non-alignment. In the midst of great power competition, Malaysia needs to balance its relationship with both the US and China for its security and economic prosperity. Malaysia has to tread the fine line of not being construed as being too close with either side. The recent invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 2022 serves as an important reminder of the high risks of practicing a grand strategy that may attract unwarranted attention by strategic rivals and subsequently dragged into an armed conflict. 

The intense but quiet defence ties between the US and Malaysia should remain as it is. After all, these muted but resilient defence ties have served both Malaysia and the US very well for almost six decades and have yielded handsome strategic utility for both of these countries, and it is strategically sound to continue so.

Dr Adam Leong Kok Wey is professor of strategic studies, and the Director of the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS) at the National Defence University of Malaysia (NDUM). His latest book is Strategy and Special Operations: Eastern and Western Perspectives published by NDUM Press (2021).