Who is fanning the war in Northeast Asia? BA Hamzah

A number of countries are involved in the North Korean conflict. Russia and the United States of America, for example, are selling frigates, submarines and anti- ship missiles to countries in Northeast Asia that could fan the fires to a volatile maritime environment where China, Japan, North Korea and South Korea are key players. The tension between the key players has resulted in a situation of political uncertainty. The geopolitical uncertainty in the region is likely to result in an unwanted arms race and political realignments that may change the long- term regional geopolitical outlook.

Before pointing fingers at North Korea as the culprit, let us examine the facts on the ground. The major actors in the North Korean crisis include Russia, Japan, United States of America, South Korea and China. The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations do weigh in the crisis from time to time, though they are not directly involved.

Russia and the US account for fifty six percent of the international weapon transfers in the world for 2012-2016. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Asia and the Oceania accounted for more than 43 % of the global weapons transfers in 2012-2016. Of the regional total, Northeast Asia accounted for 24 % and Southeast Asia 22 %. They sell frigates, submarines, anti-ship missiles plus an assortment of offensive air assets to support sea power capabilities. Together with the other stakeholders, the two major arms sellers are indirectly fanning the flames of war. They should be held accountable for “the arms race” in the region.

Until recently, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu was little more than a minor irritant in Sino-Japanese relations. However, recent events suggest of rising Sino-Japanese tensions which further complicate efforts to settle the ownership issue. In 2010, for example, a Chinese fishing trawler rammed two Japan Coast Guard vessels in waters near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Japan detained the captain. Since the trawler incident, China has used force on many occasions to assert its claim.  By 2013, the conflict has taken a military twist. It involved the military (navy and air force). Japan has scrambled its fighter jets in response to the presence of China’s aircraft and naval vessels in the vicinity of the disputed islands, on a few occasions.

Geopolitical considerations by Washington and Tokyo have further compounded the issue. Although the United States says it remains neutral in the conflict between China and Japan, by its actions, Washington has sided with Tokyo in this conflict. On November 29, 2012, the U.S. Senate gave a stamp of approval for the US policy when it passed a resolution accompanying the 2013 National Defence Authorization Act to demonstrate congressional support for the Obama administration's commitment to Japan's defence.

President Obama’s policy of pivoting to Asia Pacific was couched with China and Japan in mind. President Donald Trump continued with this pro-Japan policy. Soon after his inauguration in January 2017, following decision by North Korea to test fire missiles, he sent General Mattis, the defence secretary, to reassure Japan of US support. 

According to Richard Mc Gregor (Asia’s Reckoning: China, Japan, and the Fate of U.S. Power in the Pacific Century, Penguin,2017), the Senkaku Island crisis is symptomatic of a larger geopolitical issue that is unfolding in East Asia, “where an empire post-war order, built and maintained by the US since 1945, is slowly coming apart.” In other words, the entire territorial conflict between Japan and China is no longer a bilateral issue. It involves a third party.

Mc Gregor warns that the trilateral relationship between Japan, China and the US is very brittle. If any untoward event were to happen, the entire post war order that has maintained peace in the region could collapse. Its collapse could usher in a new regional order that re-exposes the mutual antipathy between the two major powers in the region.

All this must be seen in the context of China's growing military power and Tokyo’s fear of President Trump’s isolationist policy that could leave Japan to rearm, to fend for itself.

The island dispute has increased concerns in Tokyo about Beijing's regional intentions.

Apart from the dispute over the ownership of features like the Senkaku and Takeshima/ Dokdo, there are disputes over maritime boundary delimitation between other states in the region. The use of straight baselines by China, Japan, South Korea and North Korea is problematic and has been cited as a source of irritation in the region. As a consequence of the unfinished delimitation, there are large overlapping maritime areas between different countries. For example, South Korea and North Korea have overlapping exclusive economic zones that have resulted in many armed clashes and the arrest of fishermen on both sides.

The EEZ of Japan and China overlaps in the East China Sea. This dispute results from the method for drawing their EEZ area. The Japanese insist on the median line whereas China applies the natural prolongation method. The disagreement over the Senkaku is not only about sovereignty but one of sovereign rights.

China and Japan (plus many other states) are also in disagreement with regard to the Japanese claim of an EEZ around Okinotori - two tiny pieces of low-tide elevations, which are not above water at high tide.

China and South Korea have partially overcome overlapping EEZ claims by taking steps to establish a joint fishery zone. In “the Provisional Measures Zone” both sides agree to jointly share the fishery resources for a certain period of time. Just like China and Japan, where the maritime boundaries are still unsettled, South Korea and Japan have their share of disagreements over their continental shelf and EEZ boundary delimitation as well as over the ownership of a feature Takeshima to the Japanese and Dok-Do to the Koreans, currently occupied by South Korea.

There is also a dispute between China and South Korea over a feature known as Ieodo / Suyan Rock / Socotra Rock.  This reef is submerged at all times, during high and low tide. Under Article 121 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, it is not entitled to generate any maritime zones i.e., the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or continental shelf - because it is not above water at high tide. In 2006, China protested South Korea’s unilateral action to establish a structure (the Ieodo Ocean Research Station) over the feature. Of course, South Korea ignored the protest claiming proximity and that the feature is within its EEZ.

Against the backdrop of rising tensions in the waters of NEA, and by extension the South China Sea, are concerns over the geo-strategic consequences of the new maritime order. The burning concern is not who will control/dominate the maritime domain, especially the primary sea-lanes of communication, but the nature and character of the new hegemon: will it be a benign power or not? Will the power transition lead to a confrontation that Graham Allison alluded to in his recent book- “Destined for War”: with a subtitle:  Can America and China escape Thucydides Trap?

With the expected changing of the guards, a very dangerous game of geopolitical brinkmanship is fast developing in Northeast Asia. As a new maritime order takes shape in NEA, the jockeying for power ascendancy will reverberate beyond the region.

In hind sight, the first conflict in the Korean Peninsula (1950-1953) that killed nearly 5 million soldiers and civilians came to an end only through negotiations. Worrying as it is, the current North Korean conflict, a manifestation of the power game of brinkmanship in the region, like the first conflict, it cannot be resolved by military means. It is imperative for the conflicting parties to seek a peaceful solution to the current crisis.