Consensus Deficit Undermining ASEAN Cooperation BA Hamzah

At printing time, some twenty Heads of state (including President Trump, President Xi Jing-ping, President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe) would have arrived Manila to participate in the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) 31^st Summit (12-14 November). Besides discussing international trade, trading blocs, South China Sea and implications on maritime security and the North Korea crisis, the unresolved crisis in Myanmar/Burma over the forceful expulsion of six hundred thousand Rohingya will surely take centre stage.

How long can ASEAN member countries close their eyes to the atrocities against the Rohingya and pretend to defend it as a domestic/internal issue of Myanmar/Burma without affecting their credibility? The consequences of the violence are felt beyond Myanmar/Burma.

Three countries directly affected by the violence are Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia. Together with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, these countries have been pressuring the international community and Myanmar/Burma to end the violence against the Rohingya.

Indonesia and Malaysia have been openly critical of Myanmar/Burma. In the past, when a member state in ASEAN conveniently brands a controversial issue as a domestic/internal matter, in the name of ASEAN solidarity, it will be immediately swept under the carpet. It will be out of bounds to other member states and no member would “dare” raise questions. This common bond or consensus on non –interference is slowly being eroded. Member states will find it more daunting to withhold “interference and scrutiny” in the domestic affairs of a member state when the spill- over security impact of the policy reaches their shores.

The policy of non-interference in ASEAN is being questioned. Take the Rohingya case. Malaysia has openly registered its displeasure with Myanmar/Burma for its failure to rein in the recent military crackdown against the helpless and innocent Rohingya.  Kuala Lumpur has also distanced itself from the ASEAN Chairman Statement on Myanmar of 24 September 2017. Such disassociation is quite rare within ASEAN.

According to Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, the Chairman Statement ignored the reality on the ground. Short of labelling the atrocities as ethnic cleansing, the Foreign Minister has strongly urged “the Government of Myanmar to end the violence, stop the destruction to lives and properties, allow immediate unimpeded access for the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Rohingya and all affected communities, and to resolve the Rohingya refugee problem.”

The United Nations Security Council is deadlocked on how to bring an end to the Rohingya case. Secretary General António Guterres has accused Myanmar of ethnic cleansing. However, a binding UN Security Council Resolution pressuring Myanmar to end the violence would not be possible. As friends of Myanmar/Burma, China and Russia are likely to exercise their veto power.

In the meantime, calls by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan and the current UN Secretary General, for the Government of Myanmar to ensure the safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees to Rakhine seem to fall on deaf ears. Mr Guterres further noted that the issue of protracted statelessness of the Rohingya must be resolved by granting “nationality” status to them.

The consensus deficit among ASEAN member states on an important humanitarian issue as the Rohingya case that has received wide condemnation from the international community has, in my view, further weakened and undermined its centrality (i.e., the capacity to influence events in the region). It has also affected its credential/reputation in the international community.

In July 2012, ASEAN faced a similar problem when its Foreign Ministers failed to reach a consensus on whether the final communique should mention Scarborough Shoal, a feature disputed by China and the Philippines. According those familiar with the issue, the Philippines wanted to include such a reference. However, Cambodia as Chairman and host of the meeting objected. Neither gave in resulting in the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting at Phnom Penh failing to issue a joint statement for the first time in its 45-year history.

While the problem of reaching a consensus in ASEAN over important matters is not new, the trend does not portend well for the long- term viability of ASEAN known for eluding internal differences for a common position often expressed in the form of a joint communique or statement.

There were also tensions within ASEAN in the past, for example, over the suppression of political rights of minorities in South Thailand and South Philippines. However, unlike the current Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, these challenges were well contained within their borders without causing much international uproar. In both cases, the ASEAN leaders would officially side- step the issues to forge an agreeable common position.

Under the current geopolitical environment in the region, achieving a common position or consensus on an important issue can no longer be taken for granted.  A consensus statement on the situation in the South China Sea that goes again China, for example, is today much harder to achieve in ASEAN. Member states are more vocal and willing to dissent for reasons of domestic politics. Some member states are less likely to remain quiet and more inclined towards a policy that in the past would be considered an act of interfering in the domestic affairs of a member state- a diplomatic taboo.

In hindsight, contrary to some suggestions, what kept ASEAN together as a regional institution was not so much the policy of non-interference in the domestic politics per se, although it formed a significant element of its DNA. The good chemistry between the leaders-Suharto, Razak, Marcos, Kittikachorn and Lee Kuan Yew- and the informal ASEAN-way of dealing with difficult issues helped ease tensions. By focussing on common security issues and shelving temporarily bilateral problems from the official agenda, the ASEAN original five were able to muddle through. The informal ASEAN- style of discussing problems on golf courses, joget   and durian parties helped cement personal ties between the leaders. However, the credit for creating the cosy environment for leaders to chill- off goes to foreign ministers and diplomats. After all, ASEAN is an inter-governmental organisation led by diplomats from the respective member states.

In early days of its inception, ASEAN benefitted from the wisdom of strong –willed nationalists, intellectual heavy -weight Foreign Ministers. Adam Malik, Ghazali Shafie, Carlos Romulo, Thanat Khoman and Sinnathamby Rajaratnam were among them.

While the diplomats and foreign ministers continue to exercise some influence, ASEAN has become a bit cumbersome, today. Its size has made it less agile in adapting to changes in the geopolitical environment, for example. With five members, it was easier to make compromises and to forge consensus. Managing the centrifugal pulls tend to be more challenging with eleven countries.

As an organisation, today, ASEAN is ideologically more diverse than fifty years ago. Size, ideological orientation and geopolitical uncertainty have deepened fissures among the ASEAN members and weakened their ability to influence major events on the world stage. For example, ASEAN has very little inputs in the current North Korean conflict.

ASEAN is no longer the choice forum to discuss international security issues in the region. Even the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), which used to be the only high-level Asia Pacific-wide forum dealing with regional security since 1993, has been side-lined by other international security forums and organisations. The East Asia Security Summit (EAS) mechanism ASEAN initiated in 2005 has also lost much of its influence.

Patronage politics has taken a toll on ASEAN. The emergence of pocket-deep China has propelled many ASEAN members to rethink their political strategy as a hedge against an uncertain global security order. A recalibration of political interests among a few members in ASEAN is on the card. Such recalibration of interests may presage new political realignments with long-term consequences on regional security and the future of ASEAN itself.

Unresolved, the violence against the Rohingya and their property in Myanmar could be a tipping- point for ASEAN centrality, congeniality and cohesiveness in the near future.

Consensus deficit on key regional issues is undermining cooperation in ASEAN.