Geopolitical Developments in Asia Pacific Region: Digital Espionage on the Rise - Part 3 BA Hamzah1

Sociologists inform us that militancy thrives best in dysfunctional societies.

Honouring militants as Jihadists-fought in the name of Islam-helps their cause and shows some ignorance on our part. Criminals, murderers and sinners are NOT Jihadists. The “badge of honour” gives them a feeling of empowerment and entitlement. The media should not honour the militants by giving them the badge of honour!!

Militancy is not the preserve of any particular religion. The Irish Republican Army traced its militant activities from the Catholic and Irish nationalism. The Lords’ Resistance Army terrorising many states in Central Africa began as a Christian Army movement in Uganda. Buddhism in Myanmar should not be blamed for the activities of a few right- wing monks for what U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres described as “ethnic cleansing” against the Rohingya?

The evidence of political violence in the region- either nascent/benign or active-  is not difficult to find. Managing militancy and political violence will be more daunting in the future when some states use militant proxies to promote their “Track Two” objectives to remain in power. The use of militant proxies in Syria and Yemen, for example, has widened the scope of military operations on the ground and at the same time, make it more difficult to put an end to local conflicts as the interests of big power intersect with local interests. Those militants who survive the war (including returnees) may offer their services and wares to local militants. A number of militants in our region reportedly fought in the Middle East (some as mercenaries). Apart from own funding, the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, for example, exchanged hostages for ransom. The fund and guns for “local militia”, according to reliable sources, come from overseas-through their comrades- in- arm notably in the Middle East.

Cyber warfare, information and espionage go hand in hand. We are ow in a new digital age whereby managing cyber warfare will be a real headache. As no nation is an island, managing cyber warfare calls for a regional and global approach. Unfortunately, states are reluctant to tackle the problem for two main reasons: their own insecurity and the fact that they are also perpetrators in this spooky game. States with the means and capacity to undertake cyber warfare will always want to be ahead of the curve and retain the advantage for their operational use. This is a rational behaviour. There is no serious thinking state in the current digital age without cyber warriors/troopers!

The region has to live with this reality. The challenge is harnessing the technical knowledge for peace.

Cyber warfare is cheap. It is a low-cost tool of statecraft. According to the Director of US National Intelligence, “the potential for surprise in the cyber realm will increase in the next year and beyond as billions more digital devices are connected ...nation states and malign actors will become more emboldened and better equipped in the use of increasingly widespread cyber tool kits.” Cyberwarfare will be more complex in the near future because besides “malign actors”, it involves state and non-state actors. The latter uses cyber operations for commercial purposes. Cyber thefts of intellectual property happen all the times but like digital espionage against military establishments, they go unreported for various reasons.

According to one Report “Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea will pose the greatest cyber threats to the United States during the next year.” Edward Snowden and Julian Assange have separately revealed the extent of wiretapping in the United States and elsewhere. Just like information warfare, propaganda and psychological warfare, cyberwarfare can be destabilising. It is a naked form of espionage by digital means. As munitions of minds-after Philip Taylor-such activities existed even in ancient societies; they are being perfected in modern societies. The new elements in cyber warfare are the continuous updating of the virtual tools to destroy the data base of another country. The use of malware Stuxnet by Israel and the US against selected military and non-military targets in Iran is a classic case of state-sponsored digital espionage.

The pervasiveness of cyberwarfare in SEA is difficult to determine. The challenge in the region is how to cope with cyber warfare threats. Which parts of the cyber activities are legitimately classified as non-traditional security (NTS) threats; which ones fall within the domain of conventional military threats proscribed under international law? These are standard tools in any military or security organisation. Their indiscriminate use will have a bearing on bilateral relations in the region and elsewhere especially if they are states -sponsored.

The stories of the Stuxnet and how other malwares have been used to steal/destroy/neutralise the digital data (military and non-military) of friends and foes are legendary. The exposure by Albert Snowden and Julian Assange on the extent of state sponsored digital espionage is troubling. The challenge in this digital age is how to harness the virtual technology for a productive global order and not to use the advantages from the advancement in technology to create mischief and undermine the security of friendly countries. Managing regional security will be more complex in the future in weak states that cannot rein in “freelancing cyber- troopers”.

For me, the greatest security challenge in the 21st century is digital espionage. How do you prepare for it?

Conclusion

The above overview seeks to explain the factors responsible for the changing of the guards in our region. China and Japan are two new power centres that could exert more military muscles in the future in the face of the weakening of US influence and the decline in its regional prestige. Although Japan has justified its militarisation programme on the uncertainties in the region that include an assertive China (with whom it has territorial dispute) and an unpredictable North Korea, the real motivation is self- defence and preparing for the day when the US finally leave the region. Because of its past legacy, the ramification of a rearmed Japan is debatable; personally I do not expect a leopard to change its spots.  However, in the context of international politics the cliché, often attributed to Lord Palmerston, twice Prime Minister of Great Britain in the 19th century that a state has “No Permanent Friends or Enemies, Only Permanent Interests” remains valid.

The power to watch in our region is China. There is the unfounded fear of China simply because of its size. Its philosophy of peaceful rise and peaceful coexistence has been doubted. There is also the worry that an assertive China could trigger a conflict with the US, the established power that sees its pre-eminence threatened. Whether China and the US could escape the Thucydides trap is well documented in Graham Allison’s book. While US-Sino rivalry remains a critical feature in understanding the geopolitical dynamics in the region, in my view, the narrative has limitation as it does not give sufficient weight to other factors shaping the regional geo-political environment.

[1] Adapted from a lecture.