A 'Mac-Mahan' Geopolitical Interpretation of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Adam Leong Kok Wey

China’s much vaunted Belt and Road Initiative (known also as the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative) which was launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping is a master stroke that if successful, will secure China’s strategic interests for generations to come. The BRI encompasses both maritime and land routes of transportation ringing much of South East Asia with parts of the African continent and the Indian Ocean with the land mass of central Asia into the heart of Western Europe.  The BRI is a grand strategy employed by China to secure both of its land and sea lines of communication, safeguard its energy supplies, and diversification of its economic resources as well as expanding its influence and commercial activities in large parts of the Asian, African and European continents.  The BRI is said to offer up to US$ 11 trillion worth of investments and trade-offs – far overshadowing the Marshall Plan worth US$ 13 billion (about US$ 110 billion in today’s value) that rebuild Europe’s economy from the ashes of World War II. 

The BRI was designed based on China’s historic Silk Roads that had existed 2,000 years ago connecting China with Central Asia and the Middle East.  Taking a few leaves out of the ancient Silk Roads, the modern day BRI will have two components: the Silk Road Economic Belt with three major land routes connecting China to Europe (via Central Asia), and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road consisting of two major sea routes connecting China to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean via the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean. (see map below). China aims to integrate more than 60 countries and a third of the world’s GDP with its BRI.

  Source:https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/one-belt-and-one-road-connecting-china-and-the-world

Apart from China’s historical Silk Roads’ influence, the BRI also has important geo-strategic reasons behind it.  The strategic logic behind the BRI’s geographical span can be viewed through the lens of two prominent geopoliticians – Halford MacKinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan.

Halford J. Mackinder in his article “The Geographical Pivot of History” published in 1904 posited probably the first geopolitical concept that sparked significant debates and as one of the most important prescriptive geopolitical theory.  In his article Mackinder presented his Heartland Theory which was later expanded and explained in more detail in his book, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction published in 1919.  Mackinder in his Heartland Theory argued on the importance of the Eurasian landmass that largely consisted of Russia, the Himalayan region and parts of China.  Mackinder saw the importance of the land routes being revived by the building of railway lines and the interconnections it entailed as opposed to the fascination with maritime routes during his time of writing. He argued that the land with its vast resources combined with a network of modern railway lines will now be strategically more important that the seas.  Mackinder stated his famous maxim: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world.”  In sum, Mackinder saw that the main pivot in global power and influence will come from the Heartland and warned on the dangers of Russia (at that point in time) remerging as a great power after its setback in the Russo-Japanese war or an European or Asian power taking hold of Russia’s vast land space.

China’s BRI will create a new Heartland that will consist of the large landmass of China and Central Asia with parts of Eastern and Western Europe, a geographical location similar with Mackinder’s original landmass but without Russia.

China’s BRI, if successful, will create a new fulcrum of power that will have strong influence over a large Eurasian continental area and will provide China with immense economic benefits and securing its own strategic interests. The new Chinese Heartland will enable it to develop its restive western China regions, secure its energy supplies via the Central Asian region and through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and develop new land trade routes that will serve as an important alternative to China’s current reliance on maritime routes for its trade and strategic supplies. By developing its ‘western frontier’, China will be able to cut down its reliance on its eastern seaboard zones for its economic development and will inadvertently create additional strategic geographical depth in its western geographical spaces. China’s land component of BRI also appears to be a grand strategy to contain Russia’s traditional influence in East and Central Asia as well as Eastern Europe, directly at the underbelly of Russia, precipitated by China’s long-standing strategic rivalry with Russia and fears of growing Russian influence in Asia.

At the same time China had not forgotten its maritime domain. China, unlike Russia in Mackinder’s original Heartland geographical space, has vast areas with ocean frontage.  Some of its most developed cities are located in the eastern areas of China that are serviced with a network of ports. China’s trade today relies significantly on sea-lanes and maritime logistics.  The eastern China seaboard also offers an attractive (and vulnerable) target for military attacks.  China’s obsession with the South China Sea and the claiming of islands as well as building of artificial islands is a result of its perceived strategic vulnerability emanating from the sea.  China’s building of a series of ‘permanent aircraft carriers’ in the South China Sea (artificial islands) and its maritime portion of BRI points to a strong Mahanian influence.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, a prominent theorist on seapower and one of the earlier geopoliticians encapsulated his ideas in his classic book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 published in 1890. Mahan’s thoughts were written in a period in which he believed that the United States should build a formidable navy and expand its maritime capabilities to be a major seapower that could mirror Great Britain’s power and possessions in the world, which Mahan thought was gained through its preponderant maritime power.  Apart from naval strategies in war in which he famously proposed the decisive battle at sea to defeat the enemy and gain command of the sea, Mahan also suggested that in order to support its naval and merchant fleet, an aspiring seapower should gain land possessions to support its maritime fleet’s logistical needs – for example coaling stations and harbour facilities to resupply and repair its maritime fleet.  These land possessions will also serve as forward strategic bases.

Mahan’s maritime and geopolitical ideas are not original though as it had been well practiced by some of the more successful ancient civilizations and empires except he was the first to codify and write it down in a book.

China’s maritime component of BRI which will cover large maritime spaces which includes the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, through the Suez Canal and into the Mediterranean Sea is quite similar to the large oceanic areas that were visited by China’s Admiral Zheng He’s treasure fleets (except the Mediterranean Sea) in a series of seven expeditions during the early 15th century.  China then had the world’s largest naval fleet and had used it to expand its influence and trade via the Asian maritime lanes of communication.

The BRI sea-route will also involve large co-development of ports and maritime support centres in Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Djibouti, Greece and Italy. This vast network of ports will support China’s future growth as a maritime power - first to support its merchant fleet and then later its blue water navy.

China is in the midst of modernising its naval fleet including building new aircraft carriers to turn it into a respectable and capable blue water navy.  It currently has one operational aircraft carrier and plans to build an additional four new aircraft carriers.  A decade from now, China may possibly operate up to five aircraft carrier groups, and if that happens it can be safely expected that these aircraft carrier groups will operate in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and maybe even in the Mediterranean Sea. China’s investment in the BRI’s maritime sphere will prepare the necessary logistical support bases to sustain its future naval strategy and strategic interests which Mahan had pointed out as one of the key variables in ensuring the capability to project and sustaining a nation’s maritime power and extending its geopolitical presence in the world. 

The combination of Mackinder and Mahan geopolitical and strategic thoughts, which this author terms as ‘Mac-Mahan’, provides a plausible interpretation that China’s BRI is a grand strategy of epic proportions designed to safeguard China’s future economic, security and strategic interests in its maritime and land dimensions as well as expanding its power and influence over large continental land and maritime areas. If successful, China will ‘rule the Heartland’ together with the ‘command of the seas’, both vital to its strategic and geographical contexts.