Malaysia Needs More Submarines Adam Leong Kok Wey

There appears to be renewed interest today on the procurement of the two Scorpène class submarines for the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) in 2002 and arguments continue today on the strategic utility of operating just two boats. The first Malaysian submarine was subsequently completed and delivered in 2009 with the second operational in the following year.  This article will shed some light on some of the important roles and strategic utility of a submarine force, and the implications for Malaysia’s strategic context, to provide a clearer view on the murky business of underwater warfare.

Submarines are generally classified into two main categories based on their roles, nuclear armed ballistic missiles submarines and hunter-killer submarines (which primarily hunts other submarines and enemy surface ships) or types of propulsion which are either nuclear powered or diesel-electric.  Nuclear submarines are able to submerge as long as required without the need to surface, only limited by food supplies and human endurance but noisier and easier to detect with sophisticated SONAR (radars).  Diesel-electric submarines today are able to operate quieter than nuclear powered submarines but have limited time submerged.  Some diesel-electric submarines are also powered by an Air-Independent Propulsion unit (AIP) which enables a sub to submerge longer, between 14 to 21 additional days depending on which AIP system used.  Malaysia’s Scorpènes are hunter-killer submarines are diesel-electric powered, with an option to upgrade to AIP in the future. Even without an AIP system, the two Scorpènes can operate submerged for up to 21 days.

Submarines have a multitude of functions such as gathering intelligence; carrying and launching nuclear ballistic missiles – providing a first and second strike capability – as a potent equation in nuclear deterrence strategy; launching land attack cruise missiles such as the recent April 14 Tomahawk attacks against Syrian targets by US and British subs; stealthily infiltrating special operations personnel; and traditional combat roles in time of war - hunting enemy submarines and sinking enemy surface ships (both merchant and naval).

Since the end of the Second World War, submarines had only twice engaged in sinking enemy ships.  The strategic effects of these two sinkings however, although not spectacular in terms of number or tonnage of ships sunk, had yielded immense psychological fears and managed to garner consequences far above the weight of its torpedoes launched.  The sinking of an Indian frigate, the INS Khukri by a Pakistan submarine, PNS Hangor, in the 1971 India-Pakistan War had forced the India navy to cancel a crucial attack on Karachi port as well as diverting and scattering valuable naval assets to search and sink the PNS Hangor.  In the early stages of the Falklands War (1982), British submarine HMS Conqueror sunk an Argentinian cruiser, the ARA General Belgrano which gained immense strategic effect for the British forces sailing to recapture the Falklands Islands – the entire Argentinian navy returned to port and did not dare to venture out again during the Falklands War and not able to threaten the British naval forces from launching a successful land operation that defeated the Argentinians in the Falklands. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher later remarked, “The sinking of the Belgrano turned out to be one of the most decisive military actions of the war.”[1]  

Submarines are also very useful in laying mines covertly in vulnerable but important maritime areas such as enemy ports and in narrow chokepoints.  Mines had been a very useful naval weapon and was extensively used in some of the major wars and conflicts such as during World Wars I and II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Iran-Iraq war.  A significant number of surface warships, submarines and merchant ships had been sunk by mines.  For example, during World War I, the British attempted to force the Dardanelles strait by using its naval power.  However, the sinking of three Royal Navy battleships forcing the Dardanelles strait by mines foiled its naval plan and precipitated the need to conduct an amphibious landing to capture the Dardanelles peninsula which resulted in the disastrous Gallipoli campaign.  Mines had also been used to conduct blockades of enemy fleets in harbours. For example, in World War II, thousands of mines were laid in the Baltic Sea (which was instrumental in blockading Russia), in the Atlantic (to blockade Great Britain) and around Japan (successfully blockading the Japanese islands and cut off vital war supplies to the Japanese).  Mine clearance operations are costly, difficult and time consuming.  A modern submarine such as the RMN’s Scorpènes can carry up to 30 mines and are able to covertly manoeuvre into enemy harbours or narrow maritime passageways (chokepoints) to lay its mines at selected critical locations. 

Malaysia’s neighbours have also procured submarines with respectable operating tempos.  The Republic of Singapore Navy has two operational Challenger class submarines (formerly Swedish Sjöormen class subs) and two Archer class submarines (formerly Swedish Västergötland class subs), and are acquiring up to four new Type 218SG subs from Germany.  Indonesia operates four Type 209 submarines (of different variants) and may acquire an additional four more in the near term.  Meanwhile Vietnam operates six Russian-made Kilo class submarines and Thailand plans to procure up to three Type S26T submarines from China.  These developments in the region points that Malaysia’s decision to procure two submarines in 2002 was correct.  A lengthy time is needed not just to build a submarine (averaging six years to build one), but also to set up the infrastructure required to support the submarine and its logistic support facilities, and more importantly to train the submarine and maintenance personnel.  The RMN pioneering submarine crew reportedly spent four years training in France learning how to operate a submarine.  Attrition rate among submariners is also high – the long time spent underwater within the confines of the size of two buses, isolation from the outside world and its related stress and deprivations are some of the reasons why it is hard to recruit, train and retain submarine crews. Additionally, the RMN’s special operations unit, PASKAL, is now able to train and operate in submarines, enabling it to conduct stealthy maritime infiltration and exfiltration operations.   Since the size of the RMN is small, at around 15,000 men, the relative manpower base to source its submarine personnel is limited and requires substantial efforts to maintain and manage its submarine manpower needs.  Hence the current two-boat fleet needs to be viewed realistically not just from the angle of cost affordability and quantitative value but also the necessary manpower required to sustain its operational tempo.

Malaysia has extensive sovereign maritime areas to secure which included the Strait of Malacca and parts of the South China Sea, effectively making Malaysia responsible for some of the most important and busiest maritime sea lanes and critical ‘choke points’ in the world. The two RMN submarines are essential for Malaysia’s defensive posture in the practice of limited sea-control and anti-access naval strategies in selected maritime chokepoints and passageways.   

Although Malaysia ideally needs between six to eight submarines to provide satisfactory underwater warfare capabilities, the RMN has to cope with two submarines at this moment until budgetary funds are available to purchase more submarines, and has enhanced its capacity and capabilities to man and operate a larger submarine fleet. The two boats that Malaysia now has is still better than a ‘zero-boat’ capacity.

[1] Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 215.