The Bangsamoro Organic Law and the Role Played by Malaysia Fadzil Mokhtar

The Mindanao peace process has passed a critical landmark with the signing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law by the Philippine President on July 26, paving the way for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) - the final peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), forged over four years earlier to end the decades of deadliest conflict in the southern Philippines.   

This legislation creates a new self-governing political entity, called the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, with a parliamentary system of government headed by a Chief Minister elected by, and from, an 80 member Parliament, but only half of which will comprise of representatives of political parties while the remaining is reserved for other sectors including the minorities.  The Bangsamoro government will enjoy better fiscal allocations as well as legislative and executive powers than those of the existing 29-year-old Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) it is set to replace.  

The passage of this much awaited law has reinvigorated optimism for a lasting peace to a conflict that has caused over 120,000 deaths and shattered the lives of countless others.  Widespread support for this statute could therefore be expected especially among the Bangsamoro people, defined as the descendants of natives and original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago at the time of Spanish colonization, as it offers a more promising political, cultural and economic future for them.   The minorities would, similarly, have no reason to be less sanguine because, apart from political participation, the Bangsamoro government is mandated to promote the rights of the indigenous people, including the sharing of revenues from resources exploited in their ancestral lands.  Christian settlers are protected too, especially from discrimination   and seizure of land duly alienated to them by the government.       

Nonetheless, there are challenges to the passage of the organic law, one of which is a plebiscite in the proposed Bangsamoro areas to determine its territorial jurisdiction.   Whereas the MILF expects an area larger than the current ARMM, it is extremely unlikely that the Christian dominated adjoining province and municipalities will cede their affected constituent units to the Bangsamoro.  At  best, the MILF might thus have to potentially content with only the core territory of ARMM, comprising of five impoverished provinces, as its territorial domain, though this could lead to dissatisfaction among its ranks should they refuse to accept the verdict of the referendum. 

There are also challenges related to the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority (BTA) – an 80-strong MILF-led body that will act as the interim government pending the first Bangsamoro Parliamentary election in 2022.   Questions remain whether the MILF has the capacity to unify this heterogeneous assemblage with half of its members coming from various sectors not necessarily aligned to the Moro Front.    If it does not, and, worse still, if it fails to enforce the appropriate standard of governance, the BTA would only perpetuate the inefficient and decadent system of government it is supposed to mend, putting paid to the hopes for a solution to the sufferings of communities stricken by the long-standing conflict.    .  

Equally challenging will be efforts to effectuate semblance of normality and stability in a region characterized by violence and the prevalence of small arms.  The presence of elements, like the MNLF and other armed groups, all of which are not bound by the CAB, would further complicate security enhancement measures.  In particular, attempts to disband these groups, as part of the normalization process, would not probably progress without resistance, and the involvement of the MILF in government security operations would further inflame their hostility towards law enforcement agencies. 

The continued presence of militant groups, in turn, would hamper efforts to get inhabitants of the Bangsamoro out of the “poverty-security trap” as the conditions for them to achieve their desired quality of life could not be firmly established.  This therefore underscores the need for the BTA to effect speedier pace of change, especially in terms of security and opportunities for the pursuit of sustainable livelihood, to avoid disillusionment, thus preventing   them from being enticed into those radical groups that have continued to operate in the southern Philippines.

Most dangerously, the Bangsamoro Organic Law is vulnerable to litigation even though legislators are confident of its ability to withstand the test for constitutionality.   In the event it does suffer a fate similar to the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain, which was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, it would not be far-fetched to expect dissenters within the MILF to continue fighting for an independent Islamic state, exacerbating the already volatile security environment in the region.   

Above all, there is Misuari who has vehemently objected to the organic law superseding the earlier MNLF peace accords. He is still a force who could shape the outcome of any peace initiative, more so one made without his participation.  It is therefore possible that the organic law would not obtain the buy-in from the Tausugs and Misuari’s MNLF faction, over whom the enigmatic leader still wields considerate influence.   Although it is still early to predict Misuari’s potential response to the creation of the Bangsamoro entity, the bombing incident in Basilan on July 31, perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf in the face of President Duterte’s peace overture, portends an imminent peril if the organic law is rejected by armed actors not privy to the CAB.     

Notwithstanding the looming challenges, the organic law is undoubtedly a historic document.  It is not only the product of the Philippine legislative process, but is indirectly the triumph for Malaysia’s foreign policy activism.  It was through Malaysia’s conscientious facilitation of the peace process since 2001, and perseverance of the two parties, that produced the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro in 2012, followed by CAB in 2014, both of which served as the precursor to the organic law.  Likewise, the Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team has contributed immensely in supporting efforts to keep the peace on the ground, and creating an enabling environment for the parties to stay the course for peace till this day.  The passage of the organic law does not end these dual roles, for much remains to be done in the normalization phase that would necessitate the continuation of Malaysia’s participation until the peace process comes to its eventual conclusion.         

It can thus be concluded that no matter high the optimism about the Bangsamoro Organic Law, the road ahead remains rocky.  While the MILF is close to getting its end of the bargain after years of painstaking negotiations, the dynamics in Mindanao are far from its control.  In addition to political, cultural and legal issues, the presence of multifarious armed groups could scupper the peace process raising the spectre of continued instability before peace could finally prevail.