U.S. Begins Work On New Missiles as Trump Scraps Treaty With Russia Lara Seligman

The U.S. military will begin building and testing new, previously banned missiles following the United States’s expected withdrawal from a Cold War arms control agreement with Russia, a move that some say could set the stage for a nonnuclear missile race in Europe, the Pacific, and beyond.

The Pentagon plans to begin flight tests this year of two types of these missiles, defense officials said March 13. One effort is a low-flying cruise missile with a potential range of about 600 miles; the other is a ballistic missile with a longer range of roughly 1,900 to 2,500 miles, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to a small group of reporters at the Pentagon.

Pentagon officials declined to say what purpose the new missiles might serve. But they stressed that the work currently being done does not exclude the possibility that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in 1987 by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, could survive. Both countries are expected to formally exit the treaty in August.

“There’s advanced research that, if taken in one direction, could do one thing and if taken in another direction could do another,” Pentagon Deputy Comptroller Elaine McCusker told reporters during a March 12 briefing on the department’s budget request for the fiscal year 2020. “Those are some of the decisions we have to make.”

In addition, the U.S. Army is already working on a separate missile with a range that, with a simple software update, could be adjusted to extend beyond the limitations of the arms deal.

Although the original INF Treaty was designed to reduce the risk of a nuclear war, it also covers ground-based conventional missiles, with ranges of 500 to 5,500 km (300 to 3,400 miles). Crucially, China, which has a large and growing arsenal of nonnuclear missiles in this range, is not party to the agreement.

Though these weapons are in the early stages of development, arms control experts worry that their eventual deployment in Europe and elsewhere could be provocative—and unnecessary.

“Without the INF Treaty, the risks of a new missile race in Europe and beyond will grow,” said Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association. He warned that the United States now has no “viable plan” to prevent Russia from pursuing additional capabilities beyond the current reported deployment of four battalions of the 9M729 missile, which the United States and its NATO allies say violates the agreement.

Further, Reif said, there is “no military need” for the United States to develop a new missile for deployment in Europe, since the U.S. military can already deploy air- and sea-launched systems that can threaten the same Russian targets that new ground-launched missiles prohibited under the INF Treaty would.

However, Thomas Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, cautioned that it is “premature” to speculate about the impact of the new missiles until more is known about whether, where, and in what numbers they will be deployed—something that will need to be hashed out within the Trump administration and with U.S. allies.

“I don’t really believe the existence or the idea of a land-based missile is inherently destabilizing,” Karako said. “I think it’s important to tamp down the rhetoric and the adjectives and the adverbs until we get to the other side of the treaty.”

Pentagon officials declined to say what purpose the new missiles might serve. But they stressed that the work currently being done does not exclude the possibility that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in 1987 by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, could survive. Both countries are expected to formally exit the treaty in August.

“There’s advanced research that, if taken in one direction, could do one thing and if taken in another direction could do another,” Pentagon Deputy Comptroller Elaine McCusker told reporters during a March 12 briefing on the department’s budget request for the fiscal year 2020. “Those are some of the decisions we have to make.”

In addition, the U.S. Army is already working on a separate missile with a range that, with a simple software update, could be adjusted to extend beyond the limitations of the arms deal.

Although the original INF Treaty was designed to reduce the risk of a nuclear war, it also covers ground-based conventional missiles, with ranges of 500 to 5,500 km (300 to 3,400 miles). Crucially, China, which has a large and growing arsenal of nonnuclear missiles in this range, is not party to the agreement.

Though these weapons are in the early stages of development, arms control experts worry that their eventual deployment in Europe and elsewhere could be provocative—and unnecessary.

“Without the INF Treaty, the risks of a new missile race in Europe and beyond will grow,” said Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association. He warned that the United States now has no “viable plan” to prevent Russia from pursuing additional capabilities beyond the current reported deployment of four battalions of the 9M729 missile, which the United States and its NATO allies say violates the agreement.

Further, Reif said, there is “no military need” for the United States to develop a new missile for deployment in Europe, since the U.S. military can already deploy air- and sea-launched systems that can threaten the same Russian targets that new ground-launched missiles prohibited under the INF Treaty would.

However, Thomas Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, cautioned that it is “premature” to speculate about the impact of the new missiles until more is known about whether, where, and in what numbers they will be deployed—something that will need to be hashed out within the Trump administration and with U.S. allies.

“I don’t really believe the existence or the idea of a land-based missile is inherently destabilizing,” Karako said. “I think it’s important to tamp down the rhetoric and the adjectives and the adverbs until we get to the other side of the treaty.”