Asean Should Not Be Too Obsessed With Centrality BA Hamzah

The issue of Asean centrality always crops up in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) meetings. The recent Summit (June 2019) at Bangkok and the Asia Regional Forum (ARF) meeting also discussed the issue of centrality. The mantra is always the same- Asean must exert “centrality” in all the regional security institutions that it has founded. Among them, the East Asia Summit (EAS), ARF and the Asean Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). The rationale is simple- non-Asean members of the institutions are invited guests of Asean.

Centrality is defined as having the capacity to influence, to steer the regional security policies and agendas in Asean’s favour. Here lies the crux of the problem. It obscures an acute understanding of geopolitics and power games among the big powers.  The power asymmetry and power distribution in all these institutions create a certain power imbalance that, in my view, had made it extremely difficult for Asean to play a pivotal role. Both the ARF and EAS forums, for example, have been used by the contending major powers to preserve and promote their respective security interests.

This had happened on many occasions where the interests of Asean members are pushed to the side, for example, in solving the problems in the South China Sea. A colleague from Vietnam said to me once that the big powers are using “our forums to undermine our interests” when “we are in the driver’s seat”. Surely, centrality must be more than being in the drivers’ seat!! It is a case of where money and guns do the talking!

To be influential, Asean needs strong institutions with adequate resources. Although in term of membership Asean comprises ten-member sovereign states, the Asean secretariat, technically should be the hub of Asean strategic thinking, is weak. It employs only 300 staff members. Compare this to 32,000 staff employed by the European Union, complete with credible research and policy teams. Asean has an annual budget of US$20 million derived from the member states. Pittance compared EU’s budget. The EU’s budget for 2017 was equivalent to US$151 billion; US$ 186.1 billion in 2018.

Like information, budget is about power. The more the institution has, the more influence it can exert. In most cases, money buys influence. This notwithstanding, it was a conscious decision on the part of Asean framers not to become a supranational set-up like the EU, making comparison untenable. However, even if the leaders in Asean try hard to emulate the EU, the exercise will be futile.

The big powers often exploit this weakness in Asean.

The capacity to influence events and policies is hampered by Asean’s lack of strategic vision, according to some experts. This may be so. The limited capacity of the Secretariat to handle very complex issues could be one reason. More importantly, what ails the Asean capacity to influence results from divergent national priorities that make it difficult to achieve a unified approach. The absence of unity over major issues limits its influence. Not all the member states embrace the same power; some have Treaty relationship with different big powers; some don’t. When the preference is not the same, the national policies tend to be different.

In the EU case, for example, the national priorities are cushioned by commonly agreed negotiated positions. For example, the EU has a common policy on agriculture, food safety and environmental standards. Externally, the EU speaks with one voice on issues on trade and external relations, aid and humanitarian assistance. As an organisation, the EU goes all out to promote peace, democracy and stability even beyond the EU's borders.

Dilution of Asean’s importance/centrality is key to its weakness as a pivot. For example, many important events that discuss multilateral economic cooperation that affect the member states happen outside Asean proper. The case of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) which President Trump dumped, for example, did not involve all the Asean member states. The Japanese led- caucus on trade cooperation in the Pacific i.e., the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to salvage the TPPA also did not find favour with many member states.

Another example that takes the wind of Asean’ centrality sail is the dialogue on regional security dubbed as the Shangri-La Dialogue held at Singapore. Marketed as Track One process -a euphemism for Government officials attending in personal capacity- for promoting inter-governmental security, the Dialogue is held annually by an independent think tank, the London- based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Billed as the most premier region’s summit on defense and security challenges that engage in important bilateral talks. There is no denying on the utility of the Shangri-La Dialogue as a forum to discuss regional security. Although it has not made the ADMM process redundant, it calls into question the continuing relevance of the ADMM-Plus as a regional security forum since those who attend the Dialogue also participate in the ADMM-Plus process.

Does it matter whether Asean has centrality or not?

To me, it does not matter at all so long as Asean remains united and vibrant internally to undertake the objectives it was designed for. I do not fully subscribe to the idea suggested by some that “unless member states can put their common causes above their narrow internal political interests, global powers such as China, India and the US will continue to run roughshod over their agenda.”

On the contrary, no external powers can exploit Asean if we are internally united.

The late Deng Xiao-ping once remarked in respect of his economic reforms that it does not matter whether a cat is white or black so long it catches mice! Similarly, it does not matter whether Asean has centrality or not so long as it continues to serve the region as originally designed.

Centrality is relevant only in the context of Asean external policies. Any disagreement or agreement on the role of Asean in multilateral forums will not cause Asean to break up. Asean can only break up if the member states no longer see the need to stay together as a regional organisation over irreconcilable internal reasons. I do not see any member suing for a divorce proceeding, just yet. I do not think the Brexit formula applies here.

The way forward for Asean is to strengthen its internal cohesion. Having the internal resilience is more important than losing sleep over whether Asean can exert influence among the big powers. For some, internal resilience comes with stronger economic cooperation between the member states, with focus in two areas: trade and investments.

The intra-Asean trade today hovers around 26 per cent of its global share compared to sixty-three per cent in the EU. The intra- Asean investment is 19 per cent of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into Asean in 2018. Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand are three largest intra- Asean investors. The equivalent for the EU in 2016 was 60 per cent. UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands together account for 49 per cent of the projects and 54 per cent of the total value of intra-EU FDI.

The challenge to policy planners is to find the correct market tools to improve access to each other’s market. Improving the investment climate in the ten Asean member states will lead to more investments.

Although Asean’s achievement in forging a credible political- security- community that respects each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is highly commendable, continuing citizens’ support of Asean as an organisation is imperative. It is not centrality that decides on the fate of Asean. The litmus test is whether Asean can continue to stay together for a longer period amidst serious challenges to internal cohesion and human conscience like the policy of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by a member state.

Finally, Asean should not be too obsessed with the issue of centrality. It is beyond Asean to be at “the centre of things” in dealing with big powers. The US, China, Japan, Russia and India are not likely to toe the Asean line-assuming there exists one unified version-unless their interests are guaranteed.