China, Taiwan and the South China Sea Adam Leong Kok Wey

China’s maritime assertions in the South China Sea catch the most attention in news and commentaries today. The fear of a misadventure by China’s assertions in the South China Sea that may trigger a war dominates contemporary fears. Consequently, Taiwan’s strategic concerns are less discussed today. However, in a future war involving China, the most likely reason for its eruption will be over the metaphorical ‘elephant in the South China Sea room’ - Taiwan. 

The current assertive actions by China in the South China Sea with its 10-dash- line claim that includes Taiwan in its claimant areas, and artificial island-building, points to a clear strategy to contain Taiwan within its maritime sphere of influence. China’s building of military bases on its artificial islands and possible forward basing of its long-range hypersonic ballistic anti-ship missiles in the South China Sea artificial islands are part of its purported Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy to deter US military forces, especially its naval power from assisting Taiwan during hostilities. This coupled with China’s large scale military modernisation and expansion programs especially in its amphibious capabilities and expeditionary power may provide both the means to invade Taiwan, and a strategic bulwark against US expeditionary power. This may lead the Chinese to believe, dangerously, that they can capture Taiwan fast enough before the US can manoeuvre its forces to assist Taiwan.

Taiwan, however, also claims the South China Sea based on China’s claim! Taiwan had occupied Itu Aba in the South China Sea (and at the northern end of the Spratly Islands) since 1956. Taiwan built the first artificial island on Itu Aba as a coast guard base and today has an airstrip large enough to cater for military transport aircraft. Although Taiwan has not started assertive actions in the South China Sea thus far but has recently commissioned its 4,000-ton coastguard offshore patrol vessel that is set to be completed by April 2021. Taiwan’s parallel claim with China may push these two states into a potential conflict over the South China Sea in the future.

China has also been aggressively pursuing a grand strategy to ensure its geopolitical dominance and securing its lines-of-communication in the wider Indo-Pacific and Central Asia region with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By building a chain of maritime outposts and securing sea lanes of communication from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean via the BRI, China plausibly aims to isolate Taiwan’s maritime lines of communications.

China’s use of economic aid diplomacy to cut off the last few states that recognize Taiwan had also garnered some successes with Burkina Faso, Panama, and the Solomon Islands the latest states that had terminated official diplomatic recognition of Taiwan (there are only 16 states that still recognize Taiwan today). If China’s various strategies to rein in Taiwan gain traction, Taiwan may be isolated and faces dire strategic consequences with limited choices to react.

Taiwan’s relationship with China is also driven by somewhat tempestuous Taiwanese domestic politics that continue to plague Taiwan’s delicate balance of pro-independence movements with a segment of its population calling for a traditional balanced relationship with China that had served it well for decades.  Any disruption in this balancing act due to domestic pressure will disrupt the enduring strategic stability. However, almost two-thirds of Taiwanese look at themselves as Taiwanese with a meagre 4% seeing themselves as Chinese.  A recent survey found more than 70% of Taiwanese considered that Taiwan (as the Republic of China) is already an independent sovereign state.

Early this year, the traditionally pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has won again Taiwan’s election and reinstated its leader, Tsai Ing-wen, as Taiwan’s president for a second term. China views President Tsai cautiously. She is a strong supporter of democracy and hopes that China will respect and ‘coexist peacefully’ with Taiwan. She has also rejected China’s “one country, two systems” policy and more recently angered China with her vocal support of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement that has seen Hong Kong hit by waves of demonstrations. She has also pledged a ‘humanitarian action plan’ to assist Hong Kong pro-democracy activists. Taiwan is alarmed with Hong Kong’s recent experience with China and apprehensive about possible reunification plans with China.

All is not bleak, however, as two key factors may prevent hostilities from breaking out, which are Taiwan’s cross-straits economic relations and Taiwan’s defence pact with the US.

Taiwan’s economy has always been intertwined with China. Taiwan contributes a large chunk, averaging about 40%, of its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China and more than 200 hundred flights take off from Taiwan to China every week. The interlinked economic prosperity and close communication between China and Taiwan somehow offset the dismal realist picture that China and Taiwan are set on a collision course in the future.  

Taiwan’s main defence strategy appears to rely on the US’s willpower and commitment to its security treaty with Taiwan as embedded in the Taiwan Relations Act. However, the US’s resolve, as well as its capacity to defend Taiwan, remains a big question mark. Thus far, the US has stated its stance that it will not come to Taiwan’s aid if it unilaterally declares independence and China has warned that it will use force to retake Taiwan if Taiwan does so. The ambiguous nature of the US’s policy remains a key deterrent in keeping both China and Taiwan from conducting more ambitious strategic moves.

Taiwan’s small population, limited geographical size, relatively small military power compared with China and armed with near-obsolete weapons technology, indicate a very dismal outcome for Taiwan in a war without US military assistance.  Although Taiwan has started some modernisation of its military force and equipment, and the development of an ‘overall defense concept’, Taiwan still has very limited military options in fighting and surviving a war with China. This stark reality may prevent Taiwan from being too ambitious in its political adventurism without US’s support.

A war between Taiwan and China will have fatal consequences for the wider Asia-Pacific region and the rest of the world. Options available now for the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue remains elusive due to irreconcilable aims.  And that is why we must not overlook the metaphorical ‘elephant in the room’ and continue to place vigilance not just on South China Sea issues such as Chinese artificial-island building or maritime ‘militia’ operations but also on China-Taiwan strategic affairs – the most likely flashpoint that may trigger a future war in Asia.

Dr Adam Leong Kok Wey is Associate Professor in strategic studies and Deputy Director of Research in the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDiSS) at the National Defence University of Malaysia. His latest book is Killing the Enemy! Assassination Operations During World War II, published in 2020 by Bloomsbury, London.