Peacekeeping Operations: A Military Perspective from United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) Inderjit Singh

Introduction

Although the term ‘peacekeeping’ was invented in 1950s, the International management of political violence has a longer history. As international society’s most sustained attempt to work in an organized and usually multilateral fashion to reduce and manage armed conflict, understanding the theory and practice of peacekeeping sheds important light upon trends and developments in global politics more generally. In particular, it provides important insights into the codes of conduct that states have collectively devised to cope with life in an international society of states (Bull,1977). Peacekeeping refers to field operations by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary (Goulding 1993:455). Although peacekeeping operations has been the means of providing stability and peace, nevertheless the importance of military involvement assisting the civil organs of the United Nations has been the highlight of all missions.

Military involvement into peacekeeping duties has often been insignificant in negotiating all political and humanitarian aspects in seeking assistance to the plight of the people needing support and charitable aid. The combination and compendium of different military background, culture and cross-cultural personalities provides a challenging platform for all militaries from all parts of the world to work in concert. Every mission differs to another in terms of environment, culture, demographic and climate but generally the military operations are almost similar with all contributing nations having similar standard military procedures. But such military orchestra have weaknesses which should be strategically looked upon as a catalyst to further improve weaknesses that could hamper intangible factors in a mission which should be addressed and used as a guide especially in future peacekeeping operations involving Malaysian Armed Forces either as contributing forces or providing Military Observers. The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) is unique as it involves two nations unlike most peacekeeping operations, which constitutes the chartering of warring factions and rebels in displacing the current government.

In the Horn of Africa, the long lasting border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea escalated to armed conflict in May 1998 when Ethiopia launched military operations against Eritrea in the northern border area. Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on 18 June 2000 that provided for an immediate cease-fire between the two countries and requested the assistance of the UN and OAU (Organization of African Unity) in its implementation. On 31 June 2000, the Security Council, by its resolution 1312 (2000), decided to establish the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea consisting up to 100 military observers and the necessary civilian support staff in anticipation of a peacekeeping operation subject to future authorization. This paper will generally give an overview of the mission and military perspectives which can be used as a yardstick involving future military forces deployment in peacekeeping missions.

Background of Conflict

After earlier disputes about trade and currency as well as minor border clashes, on 6th May 1998 Eritreans troops launched an attack which took over the Ethiopian-administered settlement of Badme. The peace which followed three decades of civil war over Eritrean independence only lasted seven years. War broke out between independent Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998, triggered by a border dispute. In June 1998 Ethiopia began a process of expelling Eritreans, and by February 1999 more than 50,000 had been deported. Ethiopia claimed nearly as many Ethiopians had been forced to leave Eritrea. Hundreds of thousands more were also displaced by the fighting.

At that time Eritrea has a population of about four million compared to Ethiopian’s population of about eighty million. Eritrea introduced mandatory 18-month national service for 18 to 50 years old in 1995, two years after seceding from Ethiopia, to help in the reconstruction efforts following a 30-year liberation war. This prompted a serious escalation in the conflict, as the two sides mobilized between them some 800 000 troops. Various attempts at mediation by the United States, the Organization of African Union (OAU) and the UN proved unsuccesful.

Eritrea embarked upon a rapid and massive process of rearmament and remobilization. By mid-2000, Eritrea had an estimated 300,000 people under arms, more than at any one time during the liberation struggle. The battles fought were extremely violent. Tens of thousands of people were displaced, and in May 2001, the number of casualties on the Eritrea side was stated to be 19,000 Eritrea and Ethiopia signed an agreement to end hostilities in June 2000. This was followed by a comprehensive peace agreement in December providing for the delimitation and demarcation of the border and the release of all prisoners of war and others detained as a result of the war. The UNMEE monitors the disputed border, which facilitates through mediation. The war has largely reversed the benefits which independence and peace had brought Eritrea after 1991.

In May 2000, therefore UN Security Council Resolution 1298 imposed an arms embargo on both parties. It was not until 18 June 2000, however, that the two sides signed the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. By this time the conflict had cost between 70,000 and 100, 000 lives and displaced more than 1.2 million people (Adebajo 2004). It was also evident that Ethiopia had gained the upper hand militarily. UNMEE’s mandate included monitoring the cease-fire as well as the redeployment of the Armed Forces of both sides, in line with the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) envisages in the cessation agreement. The security Council insisted that the mandate would end following the conclusion of the delimitation and demarcation process for the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. Defining the exact location of the TSZ proved to be UNMEE’s first major political challenge. It was not until June 2001 that its location was established and even then this was in principle rather than in practice. Not only did the conflict parties differ on where they though the boundaries should lie, both sides proceeded to break the rules: while Ethiopia refused to with draw its troops from certain areas that UNMEE believed to be within the TSZ, notably around Irob, Eritrea denied UNMEE freedom of movement outside of the TSZ and persisted in deploying more than 6,000 militias and 3,000 police within the zone, which greatly exceed the permissible number stipulated in the terms of the agreement. By December 2000,UNMEE was joined by officials from the OAU’s Liason Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea (OLMEE)

Military Perspective for Future Engagement In UN Mission

UNMEE was the first mission in the history of UN peacekeeping charged with deploying a ‘traditional peacekeeping force’ within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council Resolution establishing such an operation’. On 15 Sept 2000, consent was given by Canada, Netherlands and Denmark to participate in UNMEE under the organizational framework of the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). Within 3 weeks of the respective national decisions, non- permanent staff of SHIRBRIG underwent joint induction training and by 15 November 2000 they were deployed to the mission area.

Rapid Deployment Forces

The application of the rapid deployment concept provides UN peacekeeping an unprecedented advantage in force mobilization, planning and deployment. In its first major operational test, the SHIRBRIG concept for the rapid deployment of a peacekeeping force clearly worked as it sent a strong message from the international community of their commitment to secure the peace, as well as their renewed commitment to UN peacekeeping operations. Militarily, the rapid deployment facilitated fast movement with units available at short notice and provided the Force with a coherent planning capability due to the cohesion of the SHIRBRIG contingent and the fact that both, troops and their command headquarters, had been jointly trained and were well-prepared to set up operations.

The rapid deployment of forces achieved numerous early goals including the opening of land corridors, the occupation of key terrain and the establishment of a visible UN presence on the ground, particularly along the sensitive central front of the war. However, flanking forces and most of the non-SHIRBRIG Forces did not arrive in theatre for several weeks or even months, which prevented the establishment of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and delayed operational activities. The deployment plan for a peacekeeping mission should ensure that all contingents arrive in theatre in due time together with sufficient numbers of rapidly deployable troops commensurate logistical support especially airlift capability, should be provided.

UNMEE experienced some initial difficulties caused by lack of compatibility of equipment used by the contingents, UN Military Observers (UNMO) and Force Headquarters. To ensure interoperability of equipment between contingents and the rest of the mission, technical agreements should be formulated to specify the Memoranda of Understanding. Standing Operational Procedures should be devised between UNHQ and Troop-Contributing countries.

When SHIRBRIG left after the designated six months, UNMEE was faced with shortages of troops and logistical supplies to replace the initial force and suffered adverse effects on operational readiness. From the onset, mission planning needs to take into account the transition from rapid deployment forces to regular troop contributors and arrange for appropriate strength of troops and logistical supplies to be available to maintain full operational readiness. UNMEE experienced significant difficulties in the procurement of accurate maps of the mission in sufficient numbers and of the same scale. Contingents had to make do with their own materials, often using different maps. This resulted in communication problems and politically governed uncertainties on sensitive border issues. Accurate maps of the area of operations must be made available upon arrival of peacekeepers.

A peacekeeping mission with a mandate to maintain the integrity of a buffer zone should have the expertise to investigate incidents of incursion. Generic guidelines and SOP on the handling of such incidents should be devised at the outset of a mission. For example, UN Military Observers have difficulties in keeping track of weapon stockpiles, as no mechanism has been agreed upon in advance on the provision of initial information by the Eritrea police and militia to UNMEE on the location or changes in stockpiles.

Military Relations with Both Nations

As provided for in the Agreement of the Cessation of Hostilities (Article 7) UNMEE established a Military Coordination Commission (MCC) to coordinate and resolve issues relating to the implementation of the mandate of the Peacekeeping Mission with the parties. In the absence of a corresponding political coordination mechanism, the MCCs have taken on extra significance in the peace process and have frequently served as a channel to exchange political views, sometimes constructively, on other occasions not, with exchanges degenerating into political impression by both parties. While some critical operational issues were successfully resolved in the MCCs, foremost among them the establishment of the TSZ, its overall progress was slow. Seemingly under clear instructions from their governments, the military delegation often refuses to move ahead on specific areas proposed by the Mission. At such separate mechanisms should be established to address political and military issues with both nations to avoid political grandstanding and ensure effective consultations on operational as well as diplomatic issues.

A team approach to interaction with the parties and diplomatic ensures unity of message and effort. An informed Field Commander is more likely to take responsible decisions with regards to his troops. Personal visits by Senior Management and the development of a good rapport with Field Commanders of both parties contribute to smooth progress of the peace process. Before any major bilateral meetings, the Force Commander consulted with the UNMEE Special Representative of the Secretary General about content and approach. He frequently undertook field trips to the Corps Commanders of both nations to clarify important issues and ensure the cooperation of the parties on a local level. This approach was crucial to cultivate relationships and bridge a communication gap between the respective capitals and their local commanders, who were not always given sufficient explanations or information concerning UNMEE’s role and mandate.

 Civil Military Actions

Winning the hearts and minds of the people is the bulk of relationship building whereby UNMEE’s Civilian-Military Coordination Cell (CIMIC) served as the primary interface between the military and various humanitarian organizations, and facilitated coordination and cooperation among humanitarian actors. CIMIC activities are an effective tool to establish good relations between the host communities and the peacekeeping force. Where feasible, Force assets should be utilized to assist a war-torn society in the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the restoration of basic services. A large number of CIMIC projects aimed at rehabilitating basic infrastructure damaged by the war were executed successfully, including the rebuilding of dams, bridges, roads, hospitals and schools. While UNMEE usually provided logistical support by utilizing Force assets, the local population contributed manual labour and, as available, building materials. This collaboration fostered good relations between UNMEE and the local population and brought relief to war-torn communities.

The border dispute with Eritrea degenerated into war. The conflict claimed 100,000 victims and 1.3 million refugees. The peace agreement signed in Algiers in 2000, paved the way for the deployment of UN Peace-keeping force UNMEE along the border and created a Boundary Commission in charge of deciding the border’s demarcation. Military Contingents from various identified countries provides the main ingredient in the peace process of all UN mission providing the security consolidation and the humanitarian assistance to win the hearts and mind of the locals in order to carry out their mandate. The deployment of the rapid deployment forces concept provided an impetus to the coherent planning capabilities of UN Peacekeeping Force. The military lessons learnt will provide a guideline and platform for future military for any UN peacekeeping operations.

The mission was ended with effect from 31 July 2008 with a UNSC resolution adopted on 30 July 2008. Peacekeepers had been driven from the border zone by Eritrea by February 2008, and Ethiopia had refused to accept a binding International Court of Justice ruling on the border issue. There are fears that this may set a precedent to show that a country can force out UN peacekeepers. Analysts also fear a new war may erupt between Ethiopia and Eritrea over the border dispute. Eritrea has, however, tried to allay fears over a new war.

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Lt Col Dr Inderjit Singh (Retired) is currently a Research Fellow with CDiSS. He served as a Military Observer and later as the Military Assistant to the Force Commander in UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) for a year in 2004.