Tensions Brewing at Luconia Shoals: Harmful for China - Malaysia Relations Vivian Louis Forbes

Combat Readiness and Practical Evidence

In late-2012, the Honourable Xi Jinping, President of China, stressed the importance of combat readiness training and joint operations to the armed forces when he became Commander-in-Chief. On 26 October 2020, the Government of China launched three spy satellites referred to as the Yaogan-30 series to add to its military surveillance constellation – the Chuangxin-5.

The revised National Defence Law expanding the powers of the armed forces came into force on 1 January 2021, the year that the Communist Party of China entered its centenary. On 4 January 2021, the President requested the military to remain on high alert. This command may have been the signal for recent brewing of tensions relating to sovereignty and territorial issues in two (or more!) geographical regions.

Military tensions manifested themselves along the Himalayan Ranges and in the South China Sea within days of Joseph Biden being inaugurated as the 46^th President of the United States on replacing Donald Trump. The China/USA cultural, diplomatic, social, and trade relations dipped to new lows during 2016 to early-2021.

Events as reported by electronic and print media, between 18 January and 20 March 2021, demonstrate the fragility of the geopolitical situations in the Asian region. First. China’s deployment of warplanes, including 12 or more aircraft, on two consecutive days over Taiwan’s airspace near the disputed Pratas Island within Taiwanese Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). The Chinese PLA (People’s Liberation Army) deployed DF-26 ballistic missile launchers to the Qingzhou training site in Shandong Province and to a location in a western province of China. These advanced intermediate ballistic missile (IRBM) launchers pose a threat to US naval bases in Japan and Guam; place India within China’s attack range; and intimidate the littoral states of the South China Sea, namely Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

Proof of Assertive Action

On 20 January 2021, media reports stated that there was a clash between Chinese and Indian border patrols along the Chinese/Indian terrestrial boundary at Nathu-la Pass in the vicinity of Sikkim, an Indian state. The Foreign Ministry of China noted that it did not have anything to offer on the incident but urged India to exercise restraint, stressing that China’s border troops are committed to upholding peace and tranquillity along the border with India. However, it urged the Indian Government to work in the same direction with China and refrain from actions that might escalate or complicate the situation along the border. Nevertheless, the skirmish left soldiers injured on both sides. Was this action a signal to the littoral states of the South China Sea basin?

On 23 January 2021, within the South China Sea (SCS) basin, USA despatched the aircraft carrier task force USS Theodore Roosevelt to the South China Sea to promote “freedom of the seas” – a US diplomatic euphemism to counter China’s military assertiveness over Taiwan’s airspace. The USS Theodore Roosevelt was accompanied by the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill, and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Russell and USS John Finn.

Provocative Actions and Militarisation

Such incidents are not unusual between these rival powers in the region. What was unusual, was that they happened at the time of the inauguration of President Biden. Each side sending warning messages to each other. China has repeatedly complained about U.S. Navy ships getting close to Chinese-occupied islands in the SCS, where Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Taiwan all have competing claims. In the same token, Chinese Coast Guard vessels and China’s maritime militia (boats purportedly engaged in fishing but carrying armed personnel) are recorded as being anchored or underway in the vicinity of marine features claimed and/or occupied by littoral states of the SCS.

Since 2010, Chinese Coast Guard vessels and fishing boats (or maritime militia) have been operating in the vicinity of the coasts of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. From 2010 to 7 March 2021 such vessels have been sighted in the vicinity of Luconia Shoals, Vanguard Bank, Natuna Archipelago and Whitsun Reef, each claimed by Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, respectively. The claims, in accordance with the provisions of the Third United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea, 1982, are on the basis that the marine features are within the Exclusive Economic Zones (200 nautical miles from the coastline and/or from the territorial sea straight baseline of each of the littoral states) and located on the natural continental shelf (that is encompassed within the 200-metre isobath).

Tensions Brewing at Luconia Shoals

Tensions between China and Malaysia are seen in events such as the landing of marine scientists from China on one of the reefs of the Luconia Shoals complex in 2010; persistent patrols over many years by China’s Coast Guard ships (CCG) at James and Luconia Shoals that are features on Malaysia’s natural continental shelf that range from 50 to 150 nautical miles off the Sarawak coast. Indeed, up to 11 Coastguard vessels have been in regular rotations in these waters during 2020. These sightings are recorded (tracked) and documented by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. These events are signals from China that it plans to maintain a maritime presence within its contested claim to most of the South China Sea.

On 19 November 2020, the CCG ship 5402 was alleged to have harassed, a drilling rig and its supply ships (boats) that were operating about 45 nautical miles north of Sarawak in an offshore permit block allocated by the Government of Malaysia to an oil and gas exploration company. The incident resulted in two weeks of increasing tensions between the ships of the CCG and the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) in the area.

Throughout 2020, China’s naval action included: sinking Vietnamese fishing vessels; despatching fishing flotilla to the offshore areas of Sabah; and positioning maritime militia to surround Philippine outposts including Scarborough Shoal (Reef). China has militarized at least seven artificial islands in the Spratly with new aircraft deployments. China announced unilateral fishing bans. It has conducted destabilizing military exercises in contested waters around disputed features. China increasingly uses its artificial islands as bases for harassment operations – to curtail access of Southeast Asian coastal states to offshore oil and gas exploration and fishery activities. On 7 March 2021, the Government of the Philippines released images of a fleet of China’s maritime militia (about 220 vessels) anchored near Whitsun Reef of the Spratly archipelago.

Controversial Coast Guard Law

China’s Coast Guard is not a civilian agency, unlike Malaysia’s Maritime Enforcement Agency. It falls directly under the Central Military Commission, and therefore is or should be considered a military agency. On 22 January 2021, the Government of China passed a controversial law that gives its Coast Guard more freedom to fire on foreign vessels, a move that could fuel the risk of military miscalculation in the Western Pacific. The law is aimed at “safeguarding national sovereignty, security and maritime rights,” the official Xinhua News Agency said in a report. The law was enacted on 1 February 2021. The law is China’s latest step to empower its coast guard, which was created in 2013 by merging several maritime agencies and incorporated in the People’s Armed Police in 2018. The fleet has increased its presence in disputed waters, including a stand-off with Malaysia and Vietnam in the South China Sea in 2019.

China has averaged an annual Coast Guard budget of $1.74 billion over the past five years. By comparison, Japan is estimated to have spent $1.5 billion per year while the average yearly budget of Vietnam and the Philippines is between $100 million and $200 million over the same period. China possesses the world largest coast fleet. The US Office of Naval Intelligence notes that China’s coast guard has some 250 vessels, including 95 vessels that displace over 1,000 tons.

Summary

China apparently believes that it is now economically and militarily powerful enough to disregard any agreements, treaties, and other diplomatic subtleties that it entered into previously that do not now align with its present objectives. China is doing in India’s Arunachal Pradesh exactly what it did in the South China Sea. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam must show a united front whilst demonstrating their interdependency. China and USA seem to ignore the resilience of the small powers to play both at their own game.

In December 2019, the Government of Malaysia, lodged a second submission for an extended continental shelf claim in the SCS to the Commission on the Legal Continental Shelf. The Government felt compelled to take this action in the light of alleged ‘intrusion’ into Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the southern sector of the SCS by China’s Coast Guard ships and fishers operating in illegal and unreported and under-reported fishing activities.

The President of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Dr Wu Shicun is on record in suggesting that the international community can expect more instability in the SCS basin in 2021. His rationale: the USA’s interference in the SCS affairs and persistent Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS); ASEAN’s growing appetite for international arbitration following the one initiated by then Government of The Philippines in 2013 and the prospects of another instigated by Vietnam. Malaysia has signalled a slightly tougher approach but not stringent enough, some may suggest, to deter China from its actions.

 Location of South Luconia Shoal (? in red) about 200km north of Bintulu, Sarawak. (Source: Google Earth, 2021)

The author of this commentary is affiliated as an Adjunct Research Professor with the National Institute for South China Sea Studies; the Maritime Institute of Malaysia; CDiSS, National Defence University of Malaysia; and the University of Western Australia.