South Korea and The Quad Jae Jeok Park

Seoul debates how it should fit in, if at all.

The United States is currently strengthening and expanding its security network by linking alliances with bilateral and mini-lateral security cooperation in the manufactured Indo-Pacific space. A typical example is the Quad, the Quadrilateral Security Cooperation agreement among the US, Japan, India, and Australia. The question is where South Korea fits in.

Seoul, which has an uneasy relationship with Japan at best, and strong trade and other links with China, the Quad’s focus, was lukewarm about participating, but with the US promoting its strategy in earnest, it is responding by identifying points of contact with its New Southern Policy. In the case of the so-called Quad Plus, which is at the core of the strategy, South Korea is turning to selective participation as the US at least ostensibly shifts its main interest to non-military areas.

The Quad itself was formed in 2007 but stalled in less than a year because of the loss of power of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Australian Prime Minister John Howard and India's lukewarm response. Revival in 2017 was possible because security cooperation has been promoted in all six bilateral unions of the four Quad countries in the 10 years since 2007. At the core of the US Indo-Pacific strategy is a security network within which various bilateral and mini-lateral security cooperation mechanisms led by the US are linked.

The existing frameworks for security cooperation, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the EAS, set the institutional framework and promoted member states’ cooperation over security within the set institutions. However, compared to Europe, where multilateral security cooperation functions efficiently, multilateral security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is relatively stagnant due to historical grievances, territorial disputes, heterogeneity of cultural, religious and political systems, and differences in economic strength.

In this context, the US intends to employ various informal and flexible forms of mini-lateral security cooperation and develop more widespread multilateral cooperation through organic synergy. The US-led security network is the lab within which these attempts are being implemented. The expanding US security network should be seen from the perspective of geostrategic competition between the US and China, which operates 350 ships in the Indo-Pacific region, and while a European state's deployment of a small number of ships does not make a big difference in the military balance, it does demonstrate ability and will.

In the event of a dispute in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, China should write a war scenario that assumes European countries such as Britain and France, as well as Japan, Australia, India, will directly or indirectly help the US. Therefore, higher thresholds are required for China to decide on military action. European countries can take the lead in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Gulf waters to fill the temporary gap left by the US, provide military information to the US, or help evacuate Americans. If the US-led security network in the Indo-Pacific region is organically linked to NATO members such as the UK and France, it could serve as a cornerstone for the formation of a huge US security network to contain China at the global level.

The two conflicting views of the US-led security network are also reflected in the debate over expanding the Quad into the so-called Quad Plus. The core axis of the US Indo-Pacific strategy is the US-led security network, of which the Quad is at the center. As the nickname "Democratic Diamond" suggests, the 2007 Quad could be accurately characterized as a security consultative body with China, a non-democratic country, in mind. However, after strong opposition from China, recognizing the Quad as a containment tool, it ran aground in less than a year and the US in response downplayed Chinese containment in 2017 and introduced non-military goals into the Quad.

The US argues that the Quad is one of its various attempts to further expand multilateral security cooperation through a multi-layered link to mini-lateral security. Just as the Quad is being given roles in various functional areas, Quad Plus is also being granted a plural rather than a singular definition. Quad Plus expands the number of countries participating in official Quad talks or participating in Quad-led military training and could prove a provocation to China.

The same applies to Quad Plus in relation to norms on universal values such as democracy and human rights. On the other hand, Quad Plus, formed around functional areas such as vaccine supply, health, infrastructure investment, climate change response, and maritime security, does not directly target China, which reduces the relative burden of participation by “plus” countries.

Cooperation on high-tech and supply chain diversification may be burdensome for participating countries because it has China in mind, whether directly or indirectly, but they are directly related to economic interests of the participants regardless. Quad countries are expected to gradually expand the scope and magnitude of regional cooperation, focusing on Quad Plus, which does not provoke China and is directly related to the economic interests of participating countries.

South Korea has been hesitant about participating in the US Indo-Pacific strategy. In particular, Seoul expresses support in principle for a peaceful resolution of the South China Sea disputes, the rule of law, and freedom of navigation and aviation, but does not participate in the US “freedom of navigation” operations in the South China Sea. However, with the US fully promoting its Indo-Pacific strategy, it has requested South Korea’s active participation. In response, South Korea has identified a point of contact between its New Southern Policy and the US Indo-Pacific strategy.

As reflected in the Fact Sheets released in November 2019 and November 2020 by the foreign ministries of the two countries through director-level consultations, the US Indo-Pacific strategy started with a security focus and is now expanding to include geopolitical factors. As a result, it could fund contact points with South Korea’s New Southern Policy and infrastructure investment. In addition, as South Korea’s interest in peace-related projects grows, part of the 3P (People, Prosperity, Peace) in the New Southern Policy and reflected in the launch of the New Southern Policy Plus (NSP Plus), the possibility of cooperation in non-traditional security areas such as the US Indo-Pacific strategy and maritime security emerges.

Although the two countries are working to identify points of contact between them, they have not managed to reach any specific agreements. In the case of infrastructure investment, there are constraining factors such as a large gap in resources between South Korea and the US. Contributions to maritime security by other regional actors can be justified as a joint response to non-traditional security issues while also laying the foundation for arms exports. But South Korea is dragging its feet on joint cooperation because of concerns that policy coordination with Quad countries such as the US may be mistaken as enhancing the regional response capability to counter China’s Grey Zone strategy.

Thus, rather than actively promoting cooperative projects by finding points of contact between the Indo-Pacific strategy and the New Southern Policy, South Korea is responding with a base level of sincerity to US demands to participate in the Indo-Pacific strategy, hoping to ensure the smooth operation of the US-South Korea alliance on issues such as the North Korean nuclear issue.

A joint statement from the US-South Korea summit in May 2021 says that the “United States and the ROK also reaffirm support for enhanced cooperation with Pacific Island Countries and acknowledge the importance of open, transparent and inclusive regional multilateralism including the Quad.”

South Korea’s perspective has changed favorably compared to the past. For a while, South Korea maintained a negative opinion of the Quad, the core of the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Seoul avoided provoking China, because it perceived the Quad as an exclusive arrangement targeting Beijing. However, with the US, at least on the surface, shifting the focus of the Quad and Quad Plus to non-military areas, South Korea is turning to selective participation.

Quad Plus actually has space for the US and China to cooperate over climate change or infrastructure investment, making it less burdensome for others to participate. On technology and supply chain diversification, Quad Plus encourages participation for economic benefits, since the US and Europe are technologically ahead of China. Yet Quad Plus, which increases the number of participating countries at ministerial or director-level meetings, is unlikely to be promoted at the moment. Even if it is promoted, Japan is likely to be reluctant to invite South Korea.

However, participation in Quad Plus could prove controversial if it increases the number of countries participating in military training through the so-called “Quad (-x) + alpha,” organized by all or some of the Quad countries and conducted with other countries. As the geopolitical competition between the US and China heats up, Quad (-x) + alpha training will draw more attention. While the US works on a new military deterrence strategy with the development of high-tech weapons systems and China’s military rise in mind, it is essential from a military point of view for South Korea to participate in the Quad (-x) + alpha military training within the US-led security network.

In actuality, South Korea has participated in various Quad training exercises along the coasts of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. For instance, in July 2021, the Pacific Vanguard training took place in Australian waters with the US, Australia, and Japan. However, as US-China relations worsen, there is a greater chance that the Quad (-x) + alpha military training will be mistaken or misperceived as military training targeting China. For the past two years, this type of training was held on a small-scale due to COVID-19, so the burden of participation was small. But when COVID-19 is under control and training is held on a large-scale, the burden of participation will increase.

In addition to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the number and scale of Quad military training exercises held in Northeast Asian waters or Japanese territories led by Japan are increasing. If South Korea does not participate in consideration of China's security interests or only participates nominally, then South Korea's positional influence in the US-led security network will decrease.

South Korea is expected to be asked to participate in a variety of controversial Quad Plus activities. Seoul’s dilemma is that in order to secure its status in the US security network, it must be active in cooperating with Quad countries, but simultaneously must consider the security interests of China, the country’s top trading partner and an important pillar in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Therefore, Seoul should actively participate in Quad Plus without paying attention to China, but only if it can be justified as responding to non-traditional security issues in the region or if it is directly related to South Korea's economic interests. However, if Quad Plus is promoted as a China-targeted strategy, caution should be taken in determining whether to participate.

Jae Jeok Park is an Associate Professor at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul. This is an edited version of an analysis by Mr. Park for the East Asia Foundation, a Seoul-based think tank. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect any official position of the East Asia Foundation.

This article was published in Asia Sentinel dated 27 October 2021. Republished with permission from Asia Sentinel.