Clausewitz was Right! Using War for Politics (The 2022 Russo-Ukraine War)  Adam Leong Kok Wey

Author’s Note: Parts of this article has been presented by the author in the CDISS Webinar: “The 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Some initial observations” conducted via Zoom on 7 March 2022. At press time, some of the author’s prescient observations about Russia’s intention to plug the Moldova-Transnistria-Odessa corridor has been reported recently (more than a month after the Webinar on 22 April 2022) as possibly the next stage of Russia’s strategy. 

Carl von Clausewitz in his magnum opus On War published posthumously in 1832 by his wife a year after his death had stated that “War is merely the continuation of policy or politics by other means”. Why policy or politics? This is because On War was written in Prussian and there is no direct translation of the Prussian word Politik in English. He, however, stated elsewhere in his book that “War is a real political instrument” which supports the thesis that Clausewitz viewed war as a tool for politics. And since policy is the output of politics, it is commonly interpreted that war is a form of political play among states and non-state actors along with other instruments such as diplomacy, economic instruments and international organizations

Clausewitz was a Prussian army officer who had served Prussia, Russia and again Prussia during the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815).  After experiencing the long and brutal Naopleonic Wars, he wrote his observations in a book.  Prussia was defeated in the dual battles of Jena and Auerstadt in 1806 by the French and forced to ally with France.  This observation later built Clausewitz’s own posit that war’s strategy is to defeat the enemy’s army. Defenseless without an army, one can march in and capture the enemy’s centre of political power - the capital city - and dictate terms. 

It is not an exaggeration to see the replay of Clauesewitz’s observations in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine with Russian military units attempted to capture Kiev, Ukraine’s capital city, by destroying Ukrainian miliary resistance. The only problem is that Ukrainian defence forces performed capable defensive actions coupled with long logistics lines and muddy tracks delaying Russian military convoys and operational manouevres.  Clausewitz would have given an approving nod on another one of his famous posits – friction – a concept that claimed that war on paper is different than a real war and infinite number of things can go wrong especially an enemy that has decided to fight stubbornly. Ukranian friction has forced the Russian forces to conduct a strategic withdrawal recently and Russian forces are poised to continue its next phase of operations at this time of writing.

But what was the Russian invasion of Ukraine about? Clausewitz’s dictum about war serves political purposes provides an apt explanation. By invading Ukraine, Russia is attempting to resolve its geopolitical position and prop up support for its political leader.

Geopolitics

After the end of the Cold War in 1989, Russia has been continuously constrained within its boundaries.  In the mid and late 1990s, the Balkans conflict spiraled out of control with wars among the newly broken-up Yugoslavian states of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Kosovo and Croatia.  With genocides going on, NATO intervened and launched air strikes against Serbia, then supported by Russia.  The conflict ended by late 1990s. Serbian leaders were punished for war crimes and NATO has demonstrated its continued relevance in the post-Cold War era.  Russia suffered the loss of influence and prestige in the Balkans.

As more former Soviet Union states started to join NATO such as Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, Russia realized that it now shares its western borders with NATO members right next door. Russia needs geographical buffer zones in its western boundaries. Hypothetically, enemies can launch attacks and advance rapidly into Russia.  This is supported by Russian memories of the Second World War in which Nazi Germany invaded Russia (Operation Barbarossa) through three thrusts – North, Central and South. Ukraine featured dominantly as one of the main axes for German’s invasion of Russia from the South. 

Just southwest of the Carpathian Mountains, there is a flat plain running from Moldova leading down to the Black Sea via Odessa. This flat plain will serve as a vulnerable front for Russia’s underbelly – Russia needs geostrategic control over this area to prevent potential enemy rapid penetrations and advances. It already has control over Transnistria, a breakaway state east of Moldova bordering Ukraine. About 1,500 Russian troops are based there.

With Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro and North Macedonia joining NATO, Ukraine remains as the missing piece in Russia’s strategic buffer area to its west. If Ukraine accents to NATO membership, Russia would have lost influence over land connections to Western and Central Europe, delegating it as an Asian power in the Eurasian landmass. 

Ukraine also has maritime access to the Sea of Azov and Black Sea with warm water ports.  If Russia can link up the Donbass region with Crimea via Mariupol and adjacent areas and further south and west by capturing Odessa, Russia would not just have control of Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea and having control to warm water ports, but also able to plug the Moldova-Odessa strategic corridor.  These geographic and strategic buffer areas provided the geopolitical perspective of Russia’s interest in Ukraine.

The turning point was when NATO in its 20^th summit in 2008 at Bucharest, announced that both Georgia and Ukraine will join NATO. Georgia shortly after announced its intention to join NATO which prompted Russia to launch a military invasion of Georgia, occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and brought Georgia back under Russia’s influence. The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 served as a stark warning that Russia will take military action if its geopolitical interests are threatened.

Ukraine, changing to a pro-Western Europe government also initiated steps to join NATO and the EU which led to the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014, annexing Crimea and propping up the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine which broke away from Ukrainian control.  The conflict continued to simmer until early this year when Russia decided to launch an invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.  Russian forces initially attempted to capture Kiev and plausibly attempted to remove and replace the Ukrainian government with one that is supportive of Russia

Propping up political leadership

Russia’s political leader, President Vladimir Putin is propping himself for popularity and glory.  He needs to demonstrate resolve and build national pride to gather support for himself in preparation for the upcoming Russian election in 2024.  The successful Russian intervention in Ukraine during 2014 worked well for him in the 2018 Russian Presidential Election – he won with a convincing 76% of the vote.  The strategic culture of Russia also plays an important role in why Putin needs to build positive perceptions about him.  Shaped by its strategic and political history, and years of communist rule by legendary figureheads such as Joseph Stalin, Russians favour heroic and strong leaders.  However, in the last couple of years, Putin’s approval rating as Russian president, according to Levada Center’s polls, hovered between 60% to 65%. This coupled with a poll which revealed that almost 48% of Russians distrusted Putin’s handling of the pandemic in 2020 provides a reasonable explanation that Putin needs a war to divert attention away from domestic issues.

These political aspects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine provide clear hints that Clausewitz’s assertion 200 years ago that war is a tool to conduct politics is still valid.  Nonetheless, Clausewitz’s dictum on “war as continuation of politics by other means”, has a second part that provides us with some optimism - that there are still other means on the table that can perhaps end this conflict such as using diplomacy and negotiations. As the Russia-Ukraine war continues to unfold with increasingly deadly and tragic consequences, the ‘other means’ of Clausewitz’s precept provides a beacon of hope (but hoping against hope) that the belligerents will consider less violent instruments to resolve the conflict.

Dr Adam Leong Kok Wey is professor of strategic studies, and the Director of the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS) at the National Defence University of Malaysia (NDUM). The author gratefully acknowledges support from the Malaysian Ministry of Higher Education grant number FRGS/1/2020/SSO/UPNM/02/1 for support for this research. His latest book is Strategy and Special Operations: Eastern and Western Perspectives published by NDUM Press (2021).