The Malayan Special Forces in The Congo

A SPECIAL TRIBUTE TO THOSE WHO SERVED IN THE MALAYAN SPECIAL FORCE IN THE CONGO

By

BA Hamzah

CDiSS will be publishing (republishing) some stories of the operations undertaken by the Malayan Special Force (MSF) in the Congo in late 1960s authorized by the United Nations. The Security Council of the United mandated a peacekeeping operation which was put under the direct authority of the Secretary General. The original mandate for establishing the United Nations Operation in the Congo (in French: Operation des Nations Unies au Congo-ONUC-for short- was to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Republic of the Congo and to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance to the newly independent state of the Republic of the Congo. The mission of ONUC was modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Congo.

ONUC was started in July 1960 and ended in June 1964. At the peak of its operations, ONUC has 20,000 officers and men (including civilians) from several states including India, Ireland, Sweden and Ethiopia.

The Malayan military Contingent comprising in total 613 men all ranks. The MSF was drawn from two of the finest units in the Federation Army, 4th Battalion, Royal Malay Regiment (A, B and C Coys) and C Squadron 2nd Reconnaissance Regiment (now 2 Armour)

On 13 September 1960 all the units of this Special Force were assembled at Imphal Camp (outside Mindef), Jalan Padang Tembak (Rifles Range Road) for a fortnight training. On 28 September, all the Ferret Scout Cars plus all other soft skinned vehicles departed for Woodlands, the former RMN Naval Base in Singapore to await the arrival of two US Navy Landing Ship Tanks (LST) to transport the MSF to the Congo.

The two LSTs arrived at Port Swettenham (now Port Klang) on 3 October 1960 to pick up the rest of the MSF on a very long voyage to the heart of Africa via the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) to the Port of Matadi, the furthest port in the Congo for oceangoing vessels, along the Congo River.

The MSF was a well- balanced force, predominantly Infantry but well supported by light armour with a Signal Detachment and Logistic service support. It was a multiracial force that excelled itself in the Congo. The officers and men comprised Malay, Chinese, Indian and Eurasian. They were there as a team to undertake a mission for the nation where race, colour, orientations and beliefs were held in high esteem.

The man given the honour to command the MSF was Lt Col Ungku (Bruno) Nazaruddin Bin Ungku Mohamad, CO 4 RMR and Maj Zain Hashim the Reconnaissance Squadron led the Recce Squadron.

Ungku Nazaruddin’s leadership, courage, and utmost confidence in troops under his command, in the face of a crisis, was exemplary and will be cherished forever. The way he succeded in calming the enemy troops was a high moment in the test of his leadership.

The tense moment is captured in the accompanying story by Major Tan Siew Soo who served the MSF twice.

I had the unique of opportunity of serving General Ungku Nazaruddin in 3rd Malaysian Infantry Brigade, Kuching, Headquarters Land Forces Malaysia (Kuching) in the late 1960s and finally, I was his MA when he became the Chief of the General Staff (now Chief of Army) in 1971. Before he left the Service, Bruno was made a four- Star General.

In recognition of his service to the nation, Ungku Din (as he was fondly known to his close friends) was appointed Ambassador to the Netherlands.

I am publishing this story to honour the contribution of the MSF Contingent, many of whom have passed on. I am indebted to my senior Col (Retd) Tan Siew Soo for penning these stories of the brave soldiers who gave their lives for the nation to ensure peace in the world.

CDiSS plans to carry more stories of the MSF from time to time.

BA HAMZAH

Editor, CDiSS Commentary.

THE LOOMING BATTLE OF NYUNZU

By

OP Tan Siew Soo, Lt Col (rtd)

Blenheim/A Coy 54-56

Nyunzu a strategic town was located about half way along the Albertville-Kabalo route in Northern Katanga. Situated at a T-Junction the northern exit led to Kongolo, the east to Albertville and the west to Kabalo.

Northern Katanga, a sub province of Katanga was itself about the size of Peninsular Malaysia. The inhabitants here were the Baluba who were openly hostile and defiant of Tshombe, the ruler of Katanga. Geographically the region belonged to Katanga but politically the Baluba belonged to the Balubakat Cartel, a party allied to Lumumba's MNC Party. The strategically important region whose commercial and economic life centred around CFL (Chemin de Fer des Grands Lacs), the great rail and port conglomerate with Belgians, French and British interests .A very important line of communication comprising the CFL railway line with a parallel road ran from the river port of Kabalo in the west to Albertville in the east by the western shores of Lake Tanganyika.

Under an agreement between Tshombe and ONUC in October 1960, Northern Katanga was declared a neutral zone whereby the area had neither Katangese soldiers nor the Central government army. Only ONUC were permitted to deploy troops in this wild and anarchic region. An Ethiopian and an Irish battalion were deployed at Kabalo and Albertville respectively. The agreement was broken when Congolese troops belonging to the Stanleyville faction marched south and captured the mining town of Manono in Northern Katanga. With that invasion Tshombe declared the agreement with ONUC null and void. During February and March 1961, Tshombe despatched his troops and mercenaries to recapture Manono. Not only that, he also occupied Nyunzu and Kongolo. He then despatched his mercenaries to capture Kabalo defended by the Ethiopian.It was a complete rout for Tshombe.Sailing up the Lualaba (the Congo river at this point is called Lualaba) the mercenaries met stiff opposition. A lucky mortar round hit the boiler of the river boat resulting in some mercenaries drowning and the rest captured.

After this incident ONUC decided it must assert its physical presence along the line of communication Kabalo-Nyunzu-Albertville. Nyunzu was the only location without ONUC troops. A MSF Battle Group consisting of A, B and C Coys 4 R Malay and C Sqn 2 Recce was ordered by higher command at ONUC to move from Kindu to Kabalo and there advance to occupy Nyunzu. D Coy remained at Kindu airport. This Battle Group was faced with a looming battle ahead, it was on a collision course with Tshombe forces. Earlier, Tshombe had announced to the world he did not want any ONUC troops in Nyunzu and any move into the town would be resisted by force. We knew he had troops possibly including mercenaries in Nyunzu but due to poor intelligence we were not sure of the exact strength. It was this unknown factor that caused much anxiety.

This battle for Nyunzu was going to be fought as a conventional battle as taught during our training at the Federation Military College. Our experience so far has been in counter insurgency warfare against the Communist Terrorists. Battle procedure suddenly flashed through my mind: Concentration Area (Conc Area), Assembly Area (AA), Forming Up Place (FUP) and Start Line, all these became familiar again. The mounted column led by the Recce Troops moved from Kabalo and headed east for Nyunzu, roughly one hundred and twenty kilometres away. At a small village called Luizi the column halted for the night. Here final orders for the attack was given. In military parlance this could be the Conc Area. That night many soldiers prayed very hard.

At first light the next morning the mounted column advanced spearheaded by the Recce Troops of C Sqn 2 Recce, followed by A Coy commanded by Maj Wan Ismail Mohd Salleh who was tasked as the frontal assault Coy. B Coy commanded by Maj Tunku Ahmad Maamor and C Coy commanded by Maj Robert Mahmud Yusoff were the right and left flanking assault Coys. The young Budak Boy officers involved were Lt Omar Yusof A Coy, 2/Lt Borhan Ahmad B Coy and Lt Aziz Saif C Coy. When the column advanced nearer to Nyunzu it halted again at an abandoned deserted village called Mbele-bele. This could be termed the Assy Area where final preparations for battle were made.  The Battle Group then continued the Advance moving slowly and tactically towards the objective. At this stage tension and anxiety were sky high. As the column came very close to the entrance of Nyunzu, just a few hundred metres away it halted again. Here could be termed the FUP where troops shake out into battle formations for the assault upon crossing the Start Line.We awaited for H Hour which would be sent by signal.

Lt Col Bruno Ungku Nazaruddin, second from the left

in Kindu during his morning inspection round.

Capt Zakaria Dahlan (IO) on the right

In the very tense and charged atmosphere, wiser counsel prevailed. Lt Col Bruno Nazaruddin, the Commanding Officer decided to take a big risk and a chance to avoid a bloody battle. Nazaruddin immaculate as he always was, was even smarter on this occasion dressed in his newly starched cotton uniform, UN blue beret with purple heckle proudly wearing the Recce stable belt accompanied by our Sqn Leader, Maj Geoffrey Routledge (4R Tank) and French speaking together with the Battalion IO, the RSO and the all important interpreter drove up in two Land Rovers flying the UN flag from the rear behind the Ferrets and headed for Nyunzu town. They automatically drew the Katangese weapons towards them as they neared the two bunkers guarding the entrance. One itchy finger was all that was needed to trigger off a bloody battle. The Katangese soldiers manning the post knew the implications for they could hear the roar of the Ferret Scout Cars ready for action. Happily to our utter relief there was no incident.

Lt Col Bruno Ungku Nazaruddin in Nyunzu

with Brigadier Hamid Bidin on extreme right

and Brigadiers Ward and Goolsen of the 3^rd Nigerian Bde.

Notice the Recce stable belt worn by Bruno

Order had been given by the CO that if nothing was heard from him in twenty minutes, the attack on Nyunzu was to proceed.The entry of this Battle Group of 4 R Malay plus C Sqn 2 Recce into the strategically important Nyunzu town was therefore achieved without firing a shot! In brief a potential explosive situation was diffused and casualties expected from the confrontation with the Katangese forces averted. Lt Col Bruno Ungku Nazaruddin conducted himself in this situation in a calm, courageous and professional manner. His professionalism and coolness under stress inspired all of us in this operation and earned him our great respect. We all salute you, Lt.Col Bruno Ungku Nazaruddin Ungku Mohamad!! 

At Nyunzu we discovered the force level of the Katangese was one Company strong commanded by a Belgian Commandant (Major) seconded to the Katangese forces. Besides him there were two other Belgian officers. Later we also learned there was a Mercenary Platoon stationed there. We were allocated an area to occupy and digging of trenches commenced immediately.

OP Lt Tan Siew Soo during ‘Stand To’ in Nyunzu.

Carried out during first light and last light

"Stand To" at every first light and last light were carried out without fail during our entire stay at Nyunzu. The apprehensive Katangese soldiers looking at us digging trenches followed suit and carried out their "stand to"in the evenings as well. In some places we were in eye ball to eye ball contact, not a comical situation at all, one mistake with the trigger could undo all the goodwill achieved so far.

Our fine relationship with the Katangese ended abruptly on 6th May 1961. We were ordered to carry out "Operation Leopard" in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution of 21st February 1961 (S/4741) to disarm and arrest all mercenaries. On the night of 5th May orders were given to carry out the operation the next morning. The Platoon of mercenaries occupied two villas and an Officers Mess. At 0500 hours on 6th May, the MSF under cover of darkness swung into action. The three Scout Troops were given the task of establishing road blocks at the three main exits. One leading eastward to Albertville, another north to Kongolo and the other westward to Kabalo where we came from.

C Coy mission was to capture the Officers Mess and the two villas.,B Coy was the cut off force while A Coy was designated the cordon and reserve force. At 0730 hours all the mercenaries were ordered out from their accommodation and paraded outside their villas. The Security Council Resolution was read out to them. They requested for twenty minutes to think it over. It seemed a genuine request, the whole operation caught them by complete surprise. Their request was granted but after twenty minutes only 5 came out to surrender. Only then Lt Aziz Saif and his Platoon went storming into the Officers Mess and captured 2 mercenaries, both of South African origin, one was the platoon doctor and the other his driver. The remainder simply vanished, obviously they had better knowledge of the terrain there despite our cut off and cordon force! The BBC news broadcast that evening reported the fleeing mercenaries were being pursued by wild Baluba tribesmen. A BBC reporter was probably among the escapees!!!

Capturing mercenaries by the UN was an exercise in futility. UN has no power to punish them except to deport them home to their country of origin. More often than not, they would be back in the Congo after a short break.

By mid May 1961, the advance party of the Indian Brigade had arrived in Nyunzu and took over duties from us. 4 R Malay and C Sqn 2 Recce departed Nyunzu for Albertville (Kalemie) on 17 May 1961.

Lt Col TAN SIEW SOO served in the Congo from October 1960 to July 1961 and June 1962 to April 1963.

Postscript: Lt Col Bruno Ungku Nazaruddin Ungku Mohamad rose to the rank of Lt General as the Chief of General Staff (now called Chief of Army) before retirement. We the first group of MSF were all truly unsung heroes. Not a single award was given out to these pioneers of the Congo mission. No one ever complained. On reflection, I thought this incident may be of interest to some readers.